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 Studies of adult sentence processing have established that the referential 
context in which sentences are presented plays an immediate role in their 
interpretation, such that features of the referential context mitigate, and even 
eliminate, so-called ‘garden-path’ effects. The finding that the context ordinarily 
obviates garden path effects is compelling evidence for the Referential Theory, 
advanced originally by Crain and Steedman, (1985) and extended in Altmann and 
Steedman (1988).  
 Recent work by Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill and Logrip (1999) suggests, 
however, that children may not be as sensitive as adults to contextual factors in 
resolving structural ambiguities. This conclusion is not anticipated by the 
Referential Theory and it also runs counter to the Continuity Assumption, which 
 
 
supposes that children and adults access the same cognitive mechanisms in 
processing language.  
 The purpose of this work was to reexamine the observations that have led 
researchers to conclude that children, unlike adults, may lack sensitivity to 
features of the referential context in comprehension and ambiguity resolution. A 
series of experiments has been conducted to evaluate this conclusion. The 
findings show that the performance systems of children and adult differ 
minimally. Children are sensitive to the same features of the referential context as 
adults are, and they make use of the context to resolve structural ambiguities in 
sentence interpretation. 
 In addition, the present study provides evidence in favor of children’s 
pragmatic and semantic knowledge. 
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Chapter I 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
In recent years, a central topic in psycholinguistic research has been the study of 
how language is processed on-line (e.g. Frazier and Fodor, 1978; Marslen-Wilson, 
1973, 1987; Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 1995). Many experimental investigations of 
human sentence processing have shown that language comprehension takes place 
incrementally. That is, listeners do not wait until they reach the end of a sentence 
before they begin to compute an interpretation. Rather, listeners incrementally 
commit to an interpretation as the linguistic input unfolds in real time. As a 
consequence, in case of temporarily ambiguous sentences, listeners often 
experience the feeling of having been led down the ‘garden path’ (Bever, 1970). 
In the presence of a temporary ambiguity, listeners may assign an interpretation 
that later, as the rest of the sentences has unfolded, turns out to be unworkable and 
must, therefore, be abandoned (in favor of an alternative interpretation). Bever’s 
(1970) famous sentence in (1) provides us with a clear example.  
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(1) The horse raced past the barn fell. 
 
As the sentence in (1) is uttered, listeners tend to interpret the verb raced as the 
main verb of the sentence thus experiencing a garden-path when the final verb fell 
occurs. The garden-path arises because of an incorrect resolution of the temporary 
ambiguity associated with the verb raced, which can be interpreted either as a 
simple past tense or as a past participle. The local ambiguity of the verb raced is 
so strongly resolved in favor of the simple past interpretation that subjects 
typically fail to recognize the grammaticality of (1). Such sentence is indeed 
perfectly grammatical: it suffices to replace the verb raced with the unambiguous 
past participle driven, as in (2), to reveal the grammaticality of (the structure of) 
sentence (1).  
 
(2) The horse driven past the barn fell. 
 
Other examples of grammatical structures which give rise to garden-path effects 
include ambiguous sentences like (3): 
 
(3) Jeff opened the door with the key. 
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There are two ways we can interpret the sentence in (3), which ultimately depend 
on the way the Prepositional Phrase (PP) with the key is interpreted. On one 
interpretation the PP with the key specifies the instrument with which the action of 
‘opening’ has been accomplished, as paraphrased in (4).  
 
(4) Jeff opened the door using the key 
 
Under this interpretation the PP is syntactically attached high to the verb (VP-
attachment) and is interpreted as a modifier of the Verb Phrase (VP). 
Alternatively, the PP with the key can be interpreted as a modifier of the 
preceding Noun Phrase (NP) the door, specifying a property of the door that has 
been opened, as paraphrased in (5).  
 
(5) Jeff opened the door that had the key (in the lock). 
 
Under this interpretation, the PP is attached low to the NP the door (NP-
attachment). Many empirical studies have established that listeners have a strong 
preference towards VP-attachment of the PP with the key (Rayner, Carlson and 
Frazier, 1983; Taraban and McClelland, 1988).1 This conclusion is supported by 
                                                 
1 A strong bias towards VP-attachment has been uncovered in different kind of constructions (e.g. 
Ferreira & Clifton, 1986; Frazier & Rayner, 1982; Rayner et al., 1983; Rayner, Garrod, & Perfetti, 
1992).  
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the intuition that listeners would experience a garden-path if the final NP the key 
is replaced with a different NP that is less likely to be used as an instrument, as 
exemplified in (6).  
 
(6) Jeff opened the door with the rusty lock. 
 
The preference for VP-attachment predicts, in fact, that upon hearing the 
preposition ‘with’, listeners would interpret that prepositional phrase as a modifier 
of the VP; as a consequence they will expect the following NP to refer to an 
object that could serve that purpose. This is why a garden-path arises when, for 
example, an NP like the rusty lock is encountered. At this point listeners have to 
reconsider their ‘decision’ about the PP with the rusty lock and attach it to the NP 
the door in order to assign a more plausible interpretation to the sentence. 
Various hypotheses about ambiguity resolution, which underlie different 
models of sentence processing, have been proposed to account for the systematic 
misinterpretation of sentences like (6). These hypotheses differ depending on 
which factors  are taken to influence the parser in resolving syntactic ambiguities 
(and in which order).2 One of the first attempts to motivate VP-attachment 
                                                 
2Models of language processing also differ along other dimensions. First, models differ in whether 
they assume that a single syntactic interpretation is initially considered (serial models) or whether 
multiple interpretations are considered in parallel. Second, they differ on the extent to which 
processing mechanisms are modular. Existing proposals vary from models that assume that the 
human sentence processing mechanism consists of completely encapsulated modules, i.e., with 
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preference is syntactic in nature. In what has been known as the Minimal 
Attachment Principle, Frazier (1978; 1987)3 claimed that VP-attachment is to be 
preferred over NP-attachment because the syntactic structure associated with VP-
attachment is simpler (by virtue of containing less syntactic nodes). The parser 
will thus prefer the simpler structure in an attempt to reduce memory load. Other 
proposals draw upon the notion of thematic roles assigned by predicates.  For 
example, according to some authors  the parser prefers to fill the theta grid of a 
predicate as soon as possible, leaving as few unassigned theta roles as possible 
(e.g. Pritchett, 1988, 1992; Gibson 1991; Weinberg, 1992).  
For the time being, we will not try to discriminate among the different 
models of ambiguity resolution in language processing. Rather we will consider 
the claim that the problems normally encountered with sentences such as the ones 
given above could be overcome in the appropriate referential contexts (Crain and 
Steedman, 1985).  
                                                                                                                                     
every module being informationally impermeable to the work of the others, to models which argue 
for a immediate, almost word-by-word interaction among different modules. We will endorse the 
view that language understanding is incremental, a word-by-word interaction of information 
provided by syntax, semantics, pragmatics (context), and we will return on this topic shortly. 
3 But see also Kimball (1973). 
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1.2 The role of extra-sentential context  
 
Thus far, the only information we have considered as relevant for the 
interpretation of a syntactically ambiguous sentence is the information derived 
from within the sentence itself. The same goes for sentences that are only 
temporarily ambiguous. However, a further source of information that can 
influence the way a sentence is processed and interpreted comes from the context, 
linguistic or ‘real’, in which the ambiguous sentence occurs. We now illustrate the 
role played by the context in ambiguity resolution as proposed by Crain and 
Steedman (1985). The main implication subsumed by these authors is that there 
are no purely structural garden path sentences—that is garden path effects that 
cannot be eliminated by manipulating the semantics of the sentence or the context 
in which the sentence is uttered. 
 
1.2.1 The Principle of Referential Success 
 
In considering syntactically ambiguous sentences which often induce garden path 
effects, Crain and Steedman (1985) examined whether the different syntactic 
structures were associated with different discourse functions. To illustrate, let us 
consider (7). 
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(7) The horse raced past the barn fell. 
 
At the verb raced, the parser has a choice between complicating the syntactic 
structure of the definite NP and simply treating the definite as an argument of the 
verb. Once the discourse function is taken into consideration, the simple NP 
structure might be preferred not for syntactic reasons, as claimed by the 
proponents of the syntactic analyses, but rather because the use of the alternative 
analysis, the restrictive relative clause, carries some presuppositions that must be 
satisfied. Now, in absence of the appropriate context those presuppositions might 
not be satisfied. This is why, according to Crain and Steedman (1985), the 
modification interpretation is dispreferred. This follows from the Principle of 
Parsimony in (8). 
 
(8) The Principle of Parsimony 
If there is a reading that carries fewer unsatisfied but consistent 
presuppositions or entailments than any other, then, other criteria of 
plausibility being equal, that reading will be adopted as most plausible by 
the hearer, and the presuppositions in question will be incorporated in his 
or her model.     (Crain and Steedman, 1985; p. 333) 
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To illustrate, let us consider (1) here reported as (9) with his paraphrase in (10) : 
 
(9) The horse raced past the barn fell. 
 
(10) The horse that raced past the barn fell. 
 
Despite the grammaticality of (9), listeners tend to judge that sentence as 
ungrammatical as they reach the verb fell. Having interpreted the VP raced as the 
main verb, listeners experience a garden-path at the occurrence of fell because this 
verb does not constitute a good continuation of the sentence. Notice that, had 
listeners interpreted the VP raced as a modifier of the definite NP the horse as 
paraphrased in (10), they would not have experienced any problems at the 
occurrence of the verb fell. The question is why listeners do not commit to (or 
even entertain) the modifier interpretation since the beginning, in experiments 
documented in the literature prior to Crain and Steedman (1985). According to 
Crain and Steedman the answer involves two factors: first, the sentence has been 
presented in a null context,4 and second the modifier interpretation (or reduced 
relative clause interpretation) carries some presuppositions (which might fail to be 
                                                 
4 Most of the early experiments on sentence processing have been conducted using a self paced 
reading technique which requires subjects to read sentences word-by-word appearing on a 
computer screen. No context was provided.   
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satisfied in a null context or in the mental model that the listeners constructs as 
the sentence unfolds).  
 Let us start from the notion of null context. According to Crain and 
Steedman (1985), the so called null context does not exist. Even  if a sentence is 
presented outside of an explicit context, it is reasonable to assume that listeners 
conjure up a mental context as the sentence unfolds over time. That is, when 
presented with a sentence like (9), listeners will assume the existence of a horse 
upon hearing the definite NP the horse. When the verb raced appears, there are 
two alternatives. First, listeners can interpret this verb as the main verb of the 
sentence. Differently, they can take this verb as a modifier of the definite NP the 
horse. Notice that only the former interpretation would allow the listeners to 
maintain the mental context they conjured up (i.e., there is only one horse). By 
contrast, the reduced relative clause analysis would require to enrich the mental 
context. Because of the way restrictive relative clauses are ordinarily used, Crain 
and Steedman (1985) argue that entertaining the reduced relative clause would 
force a modification of the (mental) context such that multiple horses are 
available and only one of these horses was raced past the barn. At this point the 
main-verb reading is selected because it does not require any modification of the 
(mental) context. Here is how Crain and Steedman (1985) define this mechanism: 
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(11) Principle of Referential Success 
If there is a reading that succeeds in referring to an entity already 
established in the hearer’s mental model of the domain of discourse, then 
it is favored over the one that does not. 
 
The Principle of Referential Success as defined here is subsumed by the more 
general Principle of Parsimony given in (8). In fact, if one reading succeeds in 
referring to an entity already established in the mental model, then this reading 
does not implicate any change to the mental domain of discourse.  
 To recap, the main assumption of the referential theory is that, when 
presented with temporarily ambiguous sentences, the parser chooses among 
possible readings by evaluating in which contexts those readings are normally 
intended. Thus, there are no intrinsically garden-path inducing structures, but 
rather, any given structure can be easy if a sentence which can have that meaning 
is uttered in the appropriate context or hard if the relevant sentence is uttered in 
the so-called null context or in infelicitous contexts.  
 The Referential theory makes two predictions: first, it predicts that a 
sentence like (9) would be easily understood if presented in the right context (i.e. 
one with multiple horses) and second, it also predicts that a structure that is 
usually easy to understand in a null context will be hard to access if uttered in a 
context that is biased towards a competing reading. In some cases, the relevant 
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context can be ‘triggered’ by linguistic material contained in the target sentence 
itself. As an example consider the following sentence: 
 
(10) Only horses raced past the barn fell. 
 
The structural analyses predict that listeners will interpret the verb raced as the 
main verb of the sentence as illustrated above. By contrast, the Referential Theory 
proposed by Crain and Steedman (1985) predicts that a modifier interpretation 
will be selected. Upon hearing only horses, listeners will assume the existence of 
a set of horses. In addition, given the semantic properties of the focus operator 
only, the listener knows that two sets will ultimately have to be contrasted. One 
possibility is to contrast the set of horses, already established, with other entities 
which have to be introduced in the mental model, an operation that involves an 
enrichment of the mental model. Another possibility is to single out a subset of 
the horses. The Principle of Parsimony directs the parser towards the latter 
possibility because it is the one that does not require adding other entities beyond 
those that already had to be postulated upon hearing the sentence up to that point. 
In this case the listener will expect the continuation of the sentence to specify 
which property can be used to differentiate the two sets of horses being 
contrasted. The verb phrase raced past the barn serves this purpose. In fact, by 
interpreting the verb phrase raced past the barn as a modifier of the preceding NP 
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horse, the set of horses will be divided into two subsets, namely the horses that 
were ridden past the barn and those that were not. For this reason, no garden path 
is expected in a sentence like (10) according to the referential theory. To test these 
predictions, Ni, Crain and Shankweiler (1996) conducted a series of experiments 
monitoring subjects’ eye movements during a reading task. The experiment 
included sentences like the following. 
 
(11) Only businessmen loaned money at low interest were told to record their 
expenses. 
 
(12) The businessmen loaned money at low interest were told to record their 
expenses. 
 
(13) Only wealthy businessmen loaned money at low interest were told to 
record their expenses. 
 
As illustrated for (10), sentences (11) through (13) are temporarily ambiguous: the 
verb loaned can be understood as a simple past tense or as the past participle of a 
reduced relative clause modifying the NP businessmen. The latter, but not the 
former analysis will give rise to a garden-path at the later occurrence of the verb 
were told. However, while a garden-path effect is expected in (12), this is not the 
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case for (11). In (11), in fact, the presence of the focus operator only, which 
requires a contrast set, should lead the listeners towards a modifier interpretation 
of the verb loaned. The results were as anticipated. The presence of the focus 
operators, as in (12), dramatically reduced the difficulty normally encountered 
with sentences like (11). In addition, when the focus operator was present in 
sentences that also include a pre-nominal modifier, as in (13), the difficulty 
reemerged. In this case, the prenominal adjective (modifier) offered an alternative 
way to set up the two contrast sets required by only, namely a set of wealthy 
businessmen as contrasted to a set of not wealthy businessmen, before the 
ambiguous verb loaned occurs. Hence, having already established the relevant 
contrast set, upon encountering the verb loaned there was no reason to entertain 
the modifier interpretation.  
The relevance of these experiments is twofold. First, they show that the 
difficulty of so called garden-path inducing sentences can be overcome if such 
sentences are uttered in the appropriate context. Second, the results show that 
even structures that are ordinarily preferred may turn out to be unexpectedly hard 
to process in specific contexts. Taken together the findings suggest that “there 
may be no intrinsically garden-pathing structures whatever, but rather that, for 
any give sentence there are certain contexts (including the null context) which 
induce garden paths, and certain others which do not” (Crain and Steedman, 1985; 
p.345). 
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Numerous empirical studies have now been conduced to evaluate the 
extent to which initial parsing decisions are influenced by the referential context. 
Although the role of context in facilitating the processing of otherwise difficult 
sentence has been recognized, the exact stage at which the context is operative is 
still source of considerable disagreement. In particular, one line of research argues 
that context may have a very early effect, preventing the parser to entertain 
syntactically available (and possibly preferred) structures. By contrast, a different 
line of research would attribute a much weaker function to context in sentence 
processing: the function of facilitating re-analysis after a garden path is 
experienced. The lack of consensus mostly derives from experimental results 
pointing in different direction. Whereas some studies have found clear effects of 
the referential context (e.g., Altmann and Steedman, 1988; Altmann, Garnham 
and Dennis, 1992; Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard and Sedivy, 1995; 
Spivey-Kwnolton and Sedivy, 1995 and Sedivy, 2002), others have found weak or 
delayed effects (e.g., Ferreira and Clifton, 1986; Clifton and Ferreira, 1989; 
Spivey-Knowlton and Sedivy, 1995). As a potential source of the conflicting 
results, Tanenhaus et al. (1995) drew attention to the fact that most - if not all - of 
these studies involved experimental techniques which made use of printed text 
and in which the context was set up or created by linguistic material preceding the 
appearance on a screen of the target sentence. It has been pointed out by Clark 
(1992) that linguistically introduced context cannot be equated to referential 
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context. The notion of referential context in fact requires that the participants to a 
conversation have access to the same entities, as well as sharing the same 
presuppositions and the same understanding of the situation. On this scenario, a 
failure in showing effects of context for ambiguity resolution in previous studies 
might just be due to uncontrolled features of the poorly defined context.  
In recent years a new experimental technique has been developed which 
combines the possibility to use measures that are closely time-locked to the 
linguistic input and the possibility to use ‘real’ referential context (Tanenhaus et 
al., 1995:Truesweel et al., 1999; Sedivy, 2002; Spivey et al., .2003). These studies 
argued that the referential context plays a crucial role in the process of ambiguity 
resolution.  
 
 
1.3 The role of extra-linguistic context 
 
In the previous sections we have reviewed some of the literature on sentence 
processing focusing on the factors that affect the resolution of temporarily 
syntactic ambiguities. One such factor originally proposed by Crain and Steedman 
(1985) is constituted by the referential context. One of the earliest experiments 
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conducted using a free head eye-tracker technique5 demonstrated that the non 
linguistic information provided by the context has an effect on how the linguistic 
information provided by the sentence is evaluated. For example, Tanenhaus et al., 
(19995) conducted an experiment in which subjects were given instructions such 
as (14): 
 
(14) Touch the starred yellow square. 
 
The instruction in (14) was given relative to a set of four different blocks which 
could differ for marking, shape or color. The findings suggest that subjects fixate 
on the intended object (the referent for the NP the starred yellow square) 
immediately at the end of the word that uniquely singled out the referent in the 
context. In other words, depending on the objects in the context, subjects were 
able to identify the referent of the NP (the striped yellow square) even before 
hearing the noun square. For example, subject fixate on the target object 
immediately after hearing starred if only one of the objects was starred, and after 
yellow if two objects were starred but only one of them was yellow.  
                                                 
5 Subjects participating in this kind of tasks usually wear a light head-set on which two cameras 
are mounted. One camera (i.e., the scene camera) records the scene from the subject’s point of 
view. The second camera, (i.e., the eye camera) determines the subject’s eye position by 
monitoring the location of the center of the pupil and the corneal reflection. The data from the two 
cameras are then combined by computer software, so that the experimenter can determine where 
the subject is looking as the auditory stimuli are presented. 
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Another finding was that the visual context affected the resolution of a 
temporary ambiguity within a single word (Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, 
Eberhard and Sedivy, 1995). Let us consider the word candy. Upon hearing the 
first syllable of this word, the input is consistent with multiple words, for example 
words like candy or candle or candid. Subjects were instructed to Pick up the 
candy relative to a context that contained different objects Sometimes the context 
contained two objects whose names begin with the same sound as the name in the 
target (i.e., a candy and a candle); sometimes, only one such object was present (a 
candy). The results show that the subjects were able to identify the target object 
before hearing the end of the word, when no other object whose name begin with 
the same sounds, was present in the context. These set of findings provides 
compelling evidence in favor of a rapid integration of information provided by the 
referential context and linguistic information.  
As a further step, Tanenhaus et al. (1995) investigated whether contextual 
information also affects the way temporarily syntactic ambiguities are resolved. 
Recall that the importance of the extra-linguistic material, such as contextual 
information, has been questioned by the proponents of the autonomous view of 
the grammatical structure. The strongest evidence in favor of a strictly syntactic 
analysis of sentence processing, has come from studies involving temporarily 
syntactic structures with a strong bias towards one interpretation that persist even 
when the preceding linguistic context supported the alternative analysis (see 
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Spivey-Knowlton and Sedivy, 1995 for a review). However, as observed earlier, 
Tanenahus et al. (1995) claimed that the context presented under those conditions 
might not have been immediately accessible to subjects. This said, the rationale 
behind the design of the experiment conducted by Tanenhaus et al. (1995) was to 
show that when the context is immediately accessible, it can lead the subject 
towards the (syntactically) dispreferred analysis of temporarily ambiguous 
sentences. Moreover, this result can be achieved even for those ambiguous 
sentences which exhibit a strong syntactic preference, such as (15): 
 
(15) Put the apple on the towel in the box. 
 
This sentence contains a temporary syntactic ambiguity because the prepositional 
phrase (PP) could either be attached to the verb phrase (VP) put…or to the noun 
phrase (NP) the apple.6 If the listener attaches this phrase to the NP, then on the 
towel is interpreted as modifying the NP the apple, thus indicating which apple to 
move (i.e., the apple that is on the towel). However, if the PP is attached to the 
VP, then it is interpreted as modifying the VP put... Here, the NP within the PP 
receives the thematic role of destination and specifies the destination of the action 
                                                 
6 A third possibility is actually available: the PP in the box might be attached to the NP towel, thus 
specifying the location of the towel onto which the apple has to be put. We will not discuss this 
third interpretation, since no experimental condition was meant to make it contextually available. 
Furthermore, the reading under consideration was made unavailable in later studies when the 
preposition in was changed to into, e.g., Put the frog on the napkin into the box. 
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(i.e., where to put the apple). Reading time studies with sentences containing this 
type of ambiguity consistently found that, when sentences are presented in 
isolation, people show a general preference for attaching the ambiguous PP to the 
VP rather than to the NP, thus incurring in a garden-path when encountering the 
second PP in the box (Ferreira and Clifton, 1986).  
As illustrated in section 1 different explanations have been proposed for 
the source of this attachment preference outside of context. One such explanation, 
the Minimal Attachment Principle (i.e., Frazier, 1987), claims that VP-attachment 
results in syntactically simpler configurations, where syntactically simpler is 
defined in terms of the number of nodes necessary to build the relevant structure. 
Other proposals draw upon argument structure and assume that the VP-attachment 
preference follows from a parsing principle that instructs the parser to assign the 
theta roles associated with a verb as soon as possible, all other things being equal 
(Gibson, 1991; Gorrell, 1995; Weinberg, 1992, among others). In the case at end, 
the English verb put assigns three theta roles. For our purposes we can 
concentrate on the Theme role and a Destination role. The parser assigns the 
Theme theta role to the NP the apple and it assigns the Destination theta role to 
the first PP on the towel in order to discharge the theta roles associated with the 
verb put. In contrast with these structural influences on parsing, which operate 
essentially independently from any context, the referential theory predicts that the 
attachment preference for the PP for temporarily ambiguous sentences like the 
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one in (15) could shift from VP-attachment to NP-attachment depending on the 
context. That is to say, some contexts favor the VP-attachment interpretation of 
the PP on the towel; others favor the NP-attachment. To evaluate these 
predictions, Tanenhaus et al. conducted an eye-tracking experiment. Subjects 
were given instructions such as (15) (here reported as (16)) relative to two 
different contexts (see Figure 1 and Figure 2, taken from Tanenhaus et al., 1995) 
which were meant to support different attachment preferences for the first PP. 
Following the authors, we will call the two scenarios 1-Referent Context and 2-
Referent Context. 
 
(16) Put the apple on the towel in the box. 
 
 
Fig
Figure 1: one referent context 
 
Figure 2: two-referent context 
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According to Tanenhaus et al., the one-referent context, (Figure 1) supports VP-
attachment, while the two-referent context (Figure 2) supports NP-attachment. Let 
us illustrate what the Referential Theory, illustrated in the previous section, has to 
say about the two contexts employed in the Tanenhaus et al. study (1995). For 
purposes of exposition we will call a definite NP, simple definite NP, when it is 
formed by the definite article and the head noun, as in the apple; and complex 
definite NP, when it contains a modifier Interestingly, in a sentence like Put the 
apple on the towel into the box, interpreting the PP on the napkin as a destination 
of putting event amounts to treating the definite NP the apple as a simple definite 
NP. By contrast, interpreting the PP on the towel as a modifier of the definite NP 
the apple equals to treat that NP as a complex definite NP, --the apple (that is) on 
the towel.  
 As we have seen earlier, Crain and Steedman (1985) claim that simple 
definite NPs, i.e. the apple, and complex definite NPs, the apple on the towel, 
carry different presuppositions.7 A simple definite NP presupposes that there is a 
single entity that could serve as referent (i.e., it satisfies the property expressed by 
the head noun). This has been called the presupposition of Uniqueness of the 
definite determiner (see Heim, 1982).8 So in the case at hand, the definite NP the 
apple presupposes that there is a single apple in the context. Differently, a 
                                                 
7 Technically speaking, one should speak of the number of objects that need to be presupposed 
rather than the number of presuppositions. 
8 It is generally assumed that a definite NP must refer to a unique referent already established in 
the context or discourse model (see Heim, 1982) 
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complex NP presupposes that there are multiple referents (which satisfies the 
property expressed by the head noun), but only one of those entities satisfies the 
property expressed by the modifier. So, the complex definite NP the apple on the 
towel presupposes the existence of multiple apples, only one of those is on the 
towel. Thus, the simple definite NP the apple is felicitous relative to a context if 
there is only one apple (cf. 1-referent context), the presupposition of Uniqueness 
associated with the definite determiner being satisfied9. If, on the contrary, 
multiple apples are present (cf. 2-referent context), the presupposition of 
Uniqueness is not satisfied. Following the Principle of Parsimony of the 
Referential Theory, this interpretation of the definite NP must then be abandoned 
in favor of another interpretation which carries less unsatisfied presuppositions. 
Interpreting the definite NP the apple as the complex definite NP the apple on the 
towel serves this purpose. In fact, the presence of two apples in the context, only 
one of which is on a towel, allows the listener to satisfy the presupposition 
associated with the use of a complex definite NP. Thus, this interpretation of the 
definite NP must be chosen. Let us recall, that in a sentence like Put the apple on 
the towel into the box, the definite NP is interpreted as simple, i.e, the apple, if the 
PP on the towel is attached directly to the VP put, but it is interpreted as complex, 
if that PP is attached directly to the definite NP, i.e., the apple on the towel. So, in 
                                                 
9 We will see later in this work that this is not completely true and things get more complicated. 
However, since we are just illustrating the reasons behind the study here reported, we will leave 
our criticism for the following chapters. 
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the end the difference in interpreting the definite NP boils down to the difference 
as to where attach the first PP on the towel.  
 Upon hearing the NP the apple subjects can immediately identify the 
object to be moved because there is only one apple in the context. Thus, having 
decided which object to move, subjects are likely to interpret the following PP on 
the towel as a destination10. On the other hand, in the 2-Referent Context 
(Figure2) upon hearing the NP the apple subjects cannot identify the object to 
move since that noun phrase could refer to either of the two apples in the scene. 
Thus, subjects will expect the following linguistic material to provide relevant 
information about which apple is intended to be moved. The incoming PP on the 
towel could be used for this purpose if interpreted as a modifier for the NP the 
frog (NP-attachment). NP-attachment is thus predicted in the two-referent 
context. However, if the initial parsing of the sentence is syntactic in nature, as 
claimed by the syntactic models of sentence processing, subjects should still 
(although briefly) entertain the VP-attachment analysis and interpret on the towel 
as a possible destination.  
 The results from the experiment conducted by Tanenhaus et al. (1995) 
exhibit different patterns of fixation for the two visual contexts. In particular, in 
the 1-Referent Context, subject looked at the empty towel, immediately after 
                                                 
10The choice to attach the PP on the towel to the VP put in this context could be explained by any 
of the syntactical account illustrated in this chapter. We will return to this subject in the next 
chapter where we will also illustrate in details what the Principle of Referential Success assumes 
for the ambiguity of a sentence like (16). 
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hearing the PP on the towel; this indicates, according to the authors, that the 
subjects were interpreting that PP as destination (VP-attachment). By contrast, in 
the 2-Referent Context subjects almost never looked at the empty towel. 
Furthermore, there was no difference in eye-movements when subjects were 
responding to the target sentence Put the apple on the towel in the box as 
compared to the unambiguous instruction Put the apple that is on the towel in the 
box. The results were taken by the authors to indicate that participants 
immediately interpreted the PP on the towel as a modifier of the preceding NP the 
apple. Given the findings, Tanenhaus et al. (1995; p. 1634) conclude that 
“referentially relevant nonlinguistic information immediately affects the manner 
in which the linguistic input is initially structured.” 
It is time to take stock. We started this chapter by highlighting the 
relevance of temporarily ambiguous constructions for understanding the 
mechanisms that underlie the processing of sentences. We presented different 
proposals which differ relatively to the role played by extra-linguistic material 
(i.e., referential context) in resolving temporary ambiguity. In light of many 
experimental investigations on human sentence processing, there seems to be 
evidence that the process of language comprehension takes place incrementally 
and that linguistic and contextual information is integrated as the linguistic input 
is processed. However, this regards the way adults process the language. Nothing 
has been said about how children accomplish the same goal. 
 
 25
 
 
1.4 Processing abilities in children 
 
The question of how children process sentences in real time has begun to attract a 
lot of interest in recent years. Until recently, however, little was known about 
children’s processing abilities in general, and about how children resolve 
temporary syntactic ambiguities in particular. Despite the lack of studies 
specifically addressing children’s processing abilities, there are some expectations 
from the language acquisition literature about how children might employ 
syntactic, semantic and referential factors during syntactic ambiguity resolution.  
In one of the earliest attempts to study children's language processing in 
real time, Tyler and Marslen-Wilson (1981) examined children's reliance on 
syntactic, semantic and pragmatic information. Children (ages 5, 7 and 10) 
performed a word-monitoring task as they listened to either normal speech, 
semantically anomalous speech, or scrambled (syntactically anomalous) speech. 
All age groups showed patterns similar to those reported for adults, with the 
ability to detect a word becoming slower and less accurate as one compared 
normal speech to semantically anomalous speech to syntactically anomalous 
speech. This finding suggested that children were developing essentially the same 
types of analyses of the input as adults, and that the time course of the 
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construction of these syntactic and interpretative analyses did not differ across 
ages.  
Of most relevance for the current work are experiments that indicate that 
children have an understanding of the relevant contextual factors associated with 
the Referential Theory (illustrated earlier in this chapter) and employ this 
information in their ultimate comprehension of a sentence (e.g., Hamburger and 
Crain, 1982). In particular, Hamburger and Crain (1982) argued that the general 
failure of children (age form 4 to 6) to correctly act-out sentences like ‘The camel 
kicked the tiger that bumped the zebra’ was not due to a lack of knowledge of the 
relative clause structure (see Sheldon, 1974; Tavakolian,, 1981) but rather to a 
failure to satisfy the relevant felicity conditions associated with the use of 
restrictive modifiers (see also Crain, McKee and Emiliani, 1990). As mentioned 
above, the use of restrictive modifiers is appropriate if the sentence is uttered 
when the denotation of the NP contains more than one member. It was shown that 
when a set of tigers was present (e.g., three toy tigers), children showed a much 
more accurate understanding of the restrictive relative clause in the act-out task. 
These studies suggest that children have knowledge of the contextual factors 
associated with the Principle of Referential Success, and, in keeping with the 
general notion that this information plays a greater role than syntactic cues, this 
knowledge guides the understanding of the restrictive relative clause.  
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In more recent years, there has been a growing body of literature 
investigating children’s sentence processing in real time using on-line techniques 
that are familiar from adult sentence processing studies, such as cross-modal 
priming, eye-tracking and event-related brain potentials (Traxler 2002, Booth, 
MacWhinney and Harasaki 2000, Roberts, Marinis Felser, and Clahsen 2003), 
(McKee, Nicol and Daniel 1993, Love and Swinney, 1997; Trueswell, Sekerina, 
Hill and Logrip 1999, Sekerina, Stromswold and Hestvik 2004; Friederici & 
Hahne 2001). 
 Two of these studies, Love and Swinney (1997) and Roberts, Marinis, 
Felser, and Clahsen (2003) examined whether children reactivate a moved 
constituent at its gap position and how children's more limited working memory 
affects the way they process filler-gap dependencies. The study draws upon an 
area of sentence comprehension that has been extensively studied with adults, 
namely the processing of filler-gap dependencies in sentences such as Which cari 
did Mary say John had bought ti  in which the dislocated constituent which car is 
syntactically linked to its original direct object position. In generative-
transformational theories of grammar (Chomsky 1981, 1995), the syntactic link 
between these two positions is conceived of as a movement chain, with the 
original position hosting a syntactic gap (‘trace’), i.e. a silent copy of the moved 
element. Antecedent reactivation effects in cross-modal priming experiments have 
provided a source of evidence indicating that syntactic gaps are part of the 
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processing of sentence structure, by showing that the moved constituent is 
mentally reactivated at gap sites. Another important property of filler-gap 
dependencies is that they impose a burden on the processing resources insofar as 
the dislocated element must be held in working memory until it can be 
reconstructed at its original structural position. In fact, antecedent reactivation in 
filler-gap constructions has been found to be affected by working memory. 
Antecedent priming in children (age form 4 to 6 ) has been studied by Love & 
Swinney (1997). They adopted the cross-modal picture priming task from McKee, 
Nicol and McDaniel (1993) to investigate object-relative clauses such as (17):  
 
(17) [The zebra]i that #1 the hippo had kissed ti #2 ran away. 
 
Children were given pictures at the two positions indicated in (17). The picture 
could either be a picture of a related target -- the dislocated direct object NP (e.g. 
zebra in (17)), or a picture of an unrelated target, -- a picture of another animal 
(e.g. a camel for (17)). The results were similar to those found for adults. An 
antecedent-priming effect was found at the position indicated by #2 in (17), thus 
showing that children, like adults, were holding the dislocated element in working 
memory until the occurrence of the gap site, where it is reconstructed.  
In a subsequent series of experiments with similar filler-gap syntactic 
constructions, Roberts, Marinis, Felser, and Clahsen (2003) replicated the result 
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of Love and Swinney (1997) and also find a statistically significant interaction 
between the participants' working memory span and antecedent reactivation: 
High-span children and high-span adults showed evidence of antecedent priming 
at the gap site, while for the low-span participants, there was no such effect. The 
antecedent priming effect in the high-span participants indicates that in both 
children and adults, dislocated arguments access their antecedents at gap 
positions.  
 What emerges from these studies is that children from the age of 4 to 6 
employ essentially the same parsing mechanisms as adults and that differences 
between children and adults observed in these experiments can be attributed to 
other factors such as children’s more limited working memory capacity, their 
reduced lexicon, or slower speed of lexical retrieval relative to adults (see also 
Booth et al. (2000) for the demonstration of effects of memory span on children’s 
processing of structurally complex sentences). A similar conclusion has been 
drawn from the results of an eye-tracking study (Sekerina et al. 2004) with 5 to 4 
year-old children investigating the processing of reflexive and non-reflexive 
pronouns. The children’s eye movement data were found to be parallel to those of 
the adults, the only difference being that the children required more time than the 
adults to access sentence external referents for pronouns. 
Overall the results of several experiments on children’s processing 
abilities, some of which reported here, are compatible with a continuity view of 
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language processing according to which the parser is the same for children and 
adults and that any performance difference between children and adults results 
from other factors (Crain & Wexler 1999). 
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Chapter II 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter I, we introduced different models of language processing. One of the 
goals of those models is to explain how temporary syntactic ambiguities are 
resolved on-line. We have considered the hypothesis proposed by Crain and 
Steedman (1985) according to which garden path effects, might be overcome if 
the appropriate referential context is used. Several empirical studies have 
provided support to this view (Altmann and Steedman, 1988; Altmann, Garnham 
and Dennis 1992; Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill and Logrip, 1999; Sedivy, Tanenhaus, 
Chambers and Carlson, 1999; Spivey, Tanenhaus, Eberhard and Sedivy 2002; 
among the others). One such study, the one conducted by Trueswell et al. (1999), 
plays an important role in the present work because it represents one of the first 
attempts to compare children’s and adults’ processing mechanisms. As we have 
seen in Chapter I, many studies have found strong similarities in children’s and 
adults’ processing mechanisms. The next step is to investigate if children make 
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use of contextual information in the same way as adults. The present chapter 
describes a series of experiments conducted by Trueswell et al. (1999), both with 
children and adults, to evaluate if children and adults share the same processing 
mechanisms in resolving temporarily syntactic ambiguities. The findings by 
Trueswell et al. (1999) were taken by these authors to show that children might 
not be sensitive to features of the referential context to the same extent as adults 
are in resolving temporary syntactic ambiguities. The purpose of this chapter is to 
reexamine this conclusion, by highlighting one feature of the Trueswell et al. 
study which we believe deserves further scrutiny. 
 
 
2.2 A well investigated ambiguity  
 
A central question in recent studies of on-line sentence processing is whether 
children rely on the same parsing strategies as adults in resolving temporary 
syntactic ambiguities. In particular, several studies have focused on adults’ ability 
to resolve ambiguities involving two prepositional phrases (PPs) in sentences like 
(1). 
 
(1) Put the frog on the napkin into the box. 
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Upon encountering the first PP on the napkin, the listener is unsure whether 
additional linguistic material will follow. Given the incremental nature of the 
parser, which attempts to an interpretation without waiting the end of the 
sentence, a temporary ambiguity arises at this point, because the PP on the napkin 
can either be attached ‘high’ to the verb, specifying the destination of the action 
(i.e., the empty napkin), or it can be attached ‘low’ to the noun phrase, indicating 
which frog to move (i.e., the frog that is on the napkin). Previous research in adult 
sentence processing has demonstrated that, in the absence of context, the 
psychological parser prefers ‘high’ attachment, yielding the interpretation in 
which on the napkin is the destination of the action. Supporting this conclusion is 
evidence of telltale signs of garden path effects at the second PP into the box (see 
Rayner et al., 1983; Ferreira and Clifton, 1986).  
Different explanations have been proposed for the source of this 
attachment preference outside of context.11 According to Constraint Satisfaction 
models, the preference for VP-attachment is based on the lexical properties of the 
linguistic input (i.e., the verb put), and the frequency with which particular 
syntactic constructions are used. The verb put frequently associates the first PP 
with the Destination interpretation, so a VP-attachment preference for the 
sentences under consideration is predicted (Trueswell and Tanenhaus, 1994). All 
structurally-based models attribute the VP-attachment preference to a general 
                                                 
11 See Spivey-Knowlton and Sedivy (1995) and Trueswell et al. (1999) for a complete review. 
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preference towards an argument interpretation, although for different reasons. As 
we have seen above, the prepositional phrase on the napkin could either be 
attached to the preceding noun phrase the frog or it could be attached to the verb 
put. However, only when the PP on the napkin is attached to the verb it introduces 
an argument (or assigns a Theta role) while in case of NP-attachment it is 
analyzed as an adjunct.  
Interestingly for structurally-based models, the argument interpretation 
gives rise to garden path effects. Some models claim that argument interpretations 
result in structurally simpler configurations (i.e., Frazier, 1987). Other models  
assume that the VP-attachment preference follows from a parsing principle that 
instructs the parser to assign the theta roles associated with a verb as soon as 
possible, all other things being equal (Gibson, 1991; Gorrell, 1995; Weinberg, 
1992, among others). We will consider the relevance of theta role assignment for 
parsing in the next chapter. For the time being, it suffices to assume, as widely 
demonstrated, that there is a VP-attachment preference for the first PP in 
sentences like (1). For the sake of brevity, we will call this tendency VP-
attachment Preference.  
The garden path effect arises in sentences like (1) as follows. The English 
verb put assigns three theta roles. Among these three theta roles, we will focus on 
the the Theme role and the Destination role. These theta roles are usually realized 
by a noun phrase and a prepositional phrase, respectively. The parser assigns the 
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Theme theta role to the NP the frog and, in accordance to the VP-attachment 
Preference, it assigns the Destination theta role to the PP on the napkin. These 
theta roles are assigned before the parser encounters the second PP into the box. 
Having discharged the theta roles associated with the verb, the subsequent 
appearance of the PP into the box informs the parser that it has been led down a 
garden path. In response, the parser attempts to revise its initial decision to assign 
the Destination theta role to the first PP on  the napkin. The necessary revisions 
include a reanalysis of the first PP on the napkin as a modifier of the NP the frog, 
instead of the interpretation dictated by the VP-attachment Preference. 
So far, we have been talking about preferences for VP-attachment when 
sentences like (1) are presented in absence of a visual context. The effects of the 
VP-attachment Preference, however, can also be observed when sentences are 
presented in certain referential contexts. One such context is depicted in Figure 1, 
where there is one frog on a napkin, a chick, an empty napkin and a box. 
Following Tanenhaus et al. (1995), we call this the 1-Referent Context. In 
response to the instruction in (1), both children and adults are expected to 
experience a garden path in this context, when they encounter the second PP into 
the box (Tanenhaus et al., 1995).  
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          Figure 1: The 1-Referent Context 
 
(1) Put the frog on the napkin into the box. 12 
 
In other referential contexts, however, garden path effects are not anticipated. One 
such context is depicted in Figure 2, where one frog is on a napkin, a second frog 
is not on a napkin, there is an empty napkin and an empty box. Following 
Tanenhaus et al. (1995), we call this the 2-Referent Context. In response to the 
instruction in (1), in the 2-Referent Context, the parser should respond by 
analyzing the PP on the napkin as a modifier. 
                                                 
12 The example is open to another interpretation, in which the PP into the box is interpreted as a modifier of 
the preceding NP the napkin. This meaning can be paraphrased as “Put the frog on the napkin that is in the 
box”. Although this interpretation may be accessed in certain contexts, it is ruled out in the 1-Referent 
Context by the Principle of Referential Success, since there is no napkin in the box. 
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                                           Figure 2: The 2-Referent Context 
 
The elimination of garden path effects in the 2-Referent Context follows from the 
principles postulated by the Referential Theory. According to the Referential 
Theory, a parsing principle, the Principle of Referential Success directs the parser 
to abandon structural analyses that do not successfully refer to entities represented 
in its current model of the domain of discourse, and to maintain analyses that 
succeed in referring to entities in the model. In the 2-Referent Context, according 
to Truesweel et al (1999), which in turn maintains the assumption endorsed by 
Tanenhaus et al. (1995), the presence of two frogs in the domain of discourse 
prevents the parser from analyzing the PP on the napkin as the destination of the 
‘putting’ event (VP-attachment Preference). This attachment of the PP, in fact, 
would prevent the parser from successfully identifying the referent of the initial 
definite NP the frog in the discourse. Thus, the Principle of Referential Success 
preempts the application of the VP-attachment Preference and leads the parser to 
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attach the PP on the napkin as a modifier because, only on this analysis, the parser 
succeeds in referring to an entity in the discourse -- namely the frog that is on the 
napkin, thus satisfying the presupposition of uniqueness triggered by the definite 
NP the frog. Once the PP on the napkin has been attached ‘low,’ the parser 
assigns the Destination Theta role required by the verb put to the PP into the box. 
On the Referential Theory, no garden path effect is anticipated in the 2-Referent 
Context.13 
 
 
2.3 Presenting children with temporary ambiguities in context  
 
In a recent series of studies using a head free eye-tracking system, Trueswell et al. 
(1999) examined the parsing strategies used by children and adults in resolving 
the attachment ambiguity in sentences like (1), repeated below.  
 
(1) Put the frog on the napkin into the box. 
 
The experiment used an Act-out task in which subjects were asked to perform the 
instruction given by the experimenter relative to a given context. Besides, the 
                                                 
13 As we said in Chapter 1, there actually is no agreement as to whether the role of the context is 
that of facilitating the re-analysis of an interpretation that has proven untenable or that of 
preventing such an interpretation. Our phrasing assumes the latter scenario, which possibly 
represents the strongest view of the role of context. 
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participants’ eye movements were monitored as they were asked to respond to 
instructions while looking at visual displays. The visual displays constitute the 
context against which the instruction is processed. The instructions consisted of 
sentences containing the verb put followed by two prepositional phrases as in (1). 
The study considered contexts which supported the VP-preference (the 1-Referent 
Context) and contexts in which the Principle of Referential Success was expected 
to forestall the VP-Preference (the 2-Referent Context).  
The results from the adult participants are interpreted by the Trueswell et 
al. (1999) as in accordance with  the experimental hypothesis.14 In the 1-Referent 
Context, adults showed a preference for VP-attachment of the PP on the napkin. 
Although adults typically performed the correct actions (e.g., moving the frog 
directly into the box) in the 1-Referent Context, they nevertheless moved their 
eyes to the ‘empty’ napkin as they were processing the PP on the napkin. The 
actions and eye-movements by adult subjects in the 1-Referent Context are 
interpreted by Trueswell et al. (1999) as evidence that adults initially mis-
analyzed the PP on the napkin as filling the Destination theta role (hence, the 
glances to the empty napkin), but adults were able to revise their analysis (hence, 
the correct actions). According to Trueswell et al. (1999), the findings for adults in 
the 2-Referent Context were consistent with the Referential Theory. Not only did 
adults perform the correct actions in this context, but they did not move their eyes 
                                                 
14 We will offer our own interpretation of the adults’ behavior at the end of the chapter.  
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to the empty napkin. By inference, adults immediately interpreted the first PP on 
the napkin as a modifier of the NP the frog, thereby avoiding even recoverable 
garden path effects. This pattern of behavior conforms to the predictions of the 
Referential Theory.  
Let us now turn to the responses of the child subjects in the Trueswell et 
al. study. In the 1-Referent Context, children, as adults, preferred VP-attachment 
for the PP on the napkin consistently with the VP-attachment preference, but 
children were less able than adults to overcome the garden path effects they 
experienced. Not only did children look at the empty napkin, as did adults, they 
also moved the frog onto that napkin, on over half of the trials.15 We return to a 
finer grained analysis of children’s responses momentarily. It will suffice for now 
to observe one main difference between children and adults: children are less able 
than adults to recover from their initial mis-analysis of temporary ambiguities in 
sentences like (1). This difference is evident from children’s behavior alone, 
without resorting to the recording of children’s eye movements.  
The difference between children and adults also emerged in the 2-Referent 
Context. In contrast to adults, children continued to make ‘errors’ in performance, 
just as they had in the 1-Referent Context. Children performed ‘incorrect’ actions 
on over half of the trials. In particular, children’s incorrect actions involved the 
                                                 
15 Trueswell et al. (1999) do not report individual responses so we do not know whether all 
children were equally responsible for the observed non-adult responses or whether the reported 
percentages derive from a subgroup of children who consistently performed non-adult actions.  
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‘wrong frog’ -- the one that was not on the napkin-- on 90% of their non-adult 
responses. Although children manifested several distinct patterns of non-adult 
behavior, the overall conclusion would seem to be that children, as often as not, 
interpreted the PP on the napkin as the destination of the putting event, rather than 
as a modifier of the NP the frog. If so, it would seem that, for children, the 
Principle of Referential Success did not effectively block the VP-attachment 
Preference.16 And once again children were unable to revise their initial 
attachment of the PP on the napkin as the destination of the putting event. Again, 
this can be seen by looking at their actions and there is no need to consider the 
data from eye movements. 
These findings led Trueswell et al. (1999) to two conclusions. First, 
Trueswell et al. (1999) conclude that children are less able than adults to use the 
referential context to guide their on-line parsing decisions, at least in certain 
circumstances. This is how Trueswell et al. (1999; p. 121) put it: 
 
“Children’s initial parsing preferences appeared insensitive to the 
Referential Principle. Instead, children preferred the Destination 
interpretation of an ambiguous prepositional phrase (VP attachment), 
                                                 
16 For the purposes of this paper we focus on the actions performed by children. We refer the reader to 
Trueswell et al. (1999) for a complete and detailed discussion on the on-line eye-movements patterns. We 
will offer our own view about the relevance of those data momentarily. 
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regardless of context.”17 
 
The second conclusion drawn by Trueswell et al. is that children are 
unable to retrace their footsteps, once they have been led down a garden path. The 
same conclusions have been argued for by Hurewitz, Brown-Schmidt, Thorpe, 
Gleitman and Trueswell (2000).  
 In a subsequent series of experiments using a 2-referent context kind of 
scenario, Hurewitz et al. (2000), tried to evaluate the effect of isolating the 
relevant referent in the 2-Referent Context (i.e., the frog on the napkin) by means 
of two different manipulations. The first manipulation involved telling a story in 
order to direct the child’s attention on the relevant frog, i.e., the frog on the 
napkin. In one experiment, children were given the instruction after being told a 
short story by the experimenter. The story established a difference between the 
two potential referents (i.e., the two frogs). For example, in one story the frog on 
the napkin went to visit the house of Mrs. Squid (another toy animal in the story) 
and then came back were it was before (on the napkin) while the other animal, the 
frog off the napkin, did not. Children were then asked a question about which was 
the frog that went to visit the house of Mrs. Squid. Interestingly, answering this 
                                                 
17 As suggested by this quote, Trueswell et al. do not conclude that children lack knowledge of the 
Principle of Referential Success. Rather, their interpretation of the experimental results is that 
children sometimes fail to employ Principle of Referential Success under certain processing 
conditions (e.g., when the Principle of Referential Success and the lexical properties of a verb 
push in opposite directions). 
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question requires that children notice that the only difference between the two 
frogs lays in the fact that one frog is on a napkin while the other is not. After the 
child gave her answer, she was given instruction Put the frog the napkin into the 
box.  
 The results documented by Hurewitz et al. (2000) showed that even if 
children were able to use the PP on the napkin as a restrictive modifier answering 
the question, i.e., saying the frog/the one on the napkin (72% of all answers) they 
failed to analyze the same PP as modifier in acting-out the instruction of a 
sentence like Put the frog on the napkin into the box. Children’s responses to such 
sentence mirrored the ones obtained by Trueswell et al. (1999). We now turn to 
the second manipulation put forth by Hurewitz et al. (2000) in an attempt to direct 
children’s attention on the relevant referent. The idea of this further experiment 
exploited the possibility that the platforms used in previous experiments, i.e., 
napkins, were not enough salient or interesting for children thus were gone 
unnoticed. To overcome this potential problem, Hurewitz et al. (2000) decided to 
employ more salient objects as platforms: napkins were substituted with colored 
umbrellas and fancy mirrors. Other than changing the platforms the animals were 
on, everything was kept the same and the two animals in the scene were 
discernable by location (i.e, one frog was on a mirror while the other was not). 
Once again, however, children behaved as in the Trueswell et al. (1999) in 
performing the wrong action 60% of the time. The conclusions drawn by 
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Hurewitz et al. (2000) are also similar in spirit to the ones drawn by Trueswell et 
al. (1999): first, children have difficulties in recognizing referential cues as crucial 
in reference resolution (thus entertaining the VP-interpretation of the initial PP) 
and, second children are unable to recover the correct interpretation once led 
down the garden path. 
 The focus of this chapter is on the conclusion that children are less 
sensitive than adults to features of the referential context and that, therefore, their 
behavior is not governed by the same parsing principles. In what follow, we will 
argue that the persistence of a preference for VP attachment in the 2-Referent 
Context cannot be interpreted as a failure to obey the Principle of Referential 
Success. Given that the studies conducted by Trueswell at al. (1999) and Hurewitz 
et al. (2000) lead to the same conclusion, from now on we will refer to the set of 
experiments conducted in the Trueswell et al. (1999), the original study. 
However, we will refer to the experiments reported by Hurewitz et al. (2002) 
when our hypotheses will make specific predictions about the manipulations 
introduced in this study. 
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2.4 Putting children ‘in the right context’ 
 
We propose a different account of children’s non-adult behavior. We wish to 
acknowledge first that we agree with one of the conclusions offered by Trueswell 
et al. (1999). The data clearly show that children are less able than adults to revise 
their initial interpretation when they are confronted with linguistic input that 
cannot be incorporated into the structural analysis they are entertaining. This 
difference between children and adults is well documented in the literature as the 
source of children’s non-adult responses to several linguistic constructions.18 This 
said, we would like to focus on the second conclusion reached by Trueswell et al. 
(1999) namely that children’s behavior is indicative of a failure to adhere to the 
Principle of Referential Success. 
Let us have a closer look at the data. First of all, it is important to recall 
that not all the children performed non-adult actions in the 2-Referent Context of 
the Trueswell et al. experiment. Rather, roughly half of children’s responses were 
correct. In responding to (1), for example, children sometimes moved the frog 
which was already on the napkin into the box. Trueswell et al. conclude that the 
vast majority of children resorted to a guessing paradigm in the 2-Referent 
Context. According to Trueswell et al., children who produced the right sequence 
of actions, in fact, did so for the wrong reason. Their argument goes roughly as 
                                                 
18 We will review some of the relevant literature in Chapter V. 
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follows: ‘upon hearing the fragment ‘Put the frog…’most children guessed which 
of the two frogs to select. About half of the time, children made the right guess 
(though not for the right reason) choosing the frog that was on a napkin. When 
children heard the remainder of the target sentence on those trials, they were 
reticent to attach the first PP on the napkin to the VP put as suggested by the VP-
attachment preference, because the frog they had selected (by chance) was already 
on a napkin. Thus, children ignored the first PP on the napkin on these trials, and 
responded only to the second PP into the box. Evidence in favor of this 
interpretation, according to Trueswell et al. (1999), comes from the analysis of the 
pattern of fixations of children relative to the 2-referent context. According to 
Trueswell et al. (1999) children’s selection of the referent was in fact partially 
correlated to which object in the scene children happened to look first. In other 
words, children performed the correct only if they happened to look at the right 
object first (the frog already on a napkin); By contrast, they performed the 
incorrect series of actions if they happened to look at the incorrect referent first 
(the frog off the napkin).19 Now, according to Trueswell et al (1999), this 
correlation in not surprising given that correct actions involved moving the frog 
on the napkin while incorrect actions involved moving the frog not on the napkin. 
Thus, those children who were lucky enough to fixate on the right animal ended 
                                                 
19 The percentages reported by Trueswell are as follows: when the correct animal was fixated first, 
it was selected 63% of the time. In addition, when the incorrect animal was fixated first, it was 
moved 71% of the time. 
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up performing the right action. According to the authors, evidence of guessing 
also comes from the fact that even in the correct trials, children continued looking 
at the empty napkin till a little after the beginning of the second PP into the box. 
This was taken to mean that children were still considering the VP-attachment 
interpretation of the PP on the napkin even after hearing the PP into the box, 
which is the disambiguation PP, has been uttered. We think this observation has 
to be taken with a grain of salt for different reasons. First, as observed by 
Trueswell et al. (1999), dividing the data into correct and incorrect trials “resulted 
in a number of missing cells in subjects and item means, thereby making it 
difficult to perform adequate statistical test (Trueswell et al. 1999:113).” Thus the 
correlation in question might be less significant than what claimed. Second, 
although the data reported by Hurewitz (2000) for the correct trials could be used 
to support the correlation between early looks and action performed, (but we will 
see soon a criticism of this), the data relative to the incorrect trials do not. The 
data from the incorrect trials in the Hurewitz et al. (1999) study show an equal 
proportions of early looks to the correct and the incorrect object. A further 
concern about interpreting children’s early looks as predictors of children’s later 
actions has to do with the claim that incorrect actions tend to involve movements 
of the incorrect animal (Trueswell et. al 1999:115). This correspondence is only 
partially true. In fact, an incorrect action could also regard the correct object. In 
the case at hand, for example, children could have chosen the frog on the napkin 
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and moved it to the other napkin: if children have chosen that frog simply by 
guessing, nothing would have prevented them to perform this incorrect action. We 
will return on this observation soon. As a final remark, we would like to mention 
that both in correct and incorrect trials a selection of the object to move didn’t 
occur without a close competition between the two possible objects in the scene. 
Despite early looks towards on object or the other, children did considered both of 
them, looking back and forth, until at least the end of the PP on the napkin.20, 21 
To end this brief deviation on eye-movements data, we conclude that although, 
eye-tracking data could provide interesting insights about sentence processing, we 
think that the recording of the eye-movements do not add anything to the pattern 
that emerges form children’s actions. In the remainder of the chapter, we will thus 
focus on subject’s actions more than on their fixations patters. If anything, the eye 
data reported by Trueswell et al. (1999) will be also compatible with a different 
interpretation of the findings, which leads us to the next topic. 
We think another explanation of children’s adult responses is possible. In 
our view, the null hypothesis is that children’s adult responses should be 
                                                 
20 Given the data reported by Trueswell et al. (1999), it is not possible to establish the specific 
point in which an object has been chosen for the incorrect trials. In fact, since incorrect trials 
include different kind of actions, some of which involving both frogs, later looks at that correct 
object are expected.  
21 The fact that it took children considerably longer to select a referent for the definite NP has been 
used by Trueswell et al. (1999) as evidence of children’s difficulty in using the referential context 
to disambiguate the sentence in favor of the NP-attachment of the PP on the napkin. However, as 
we will see in a moment it is compatible with yet another explanation according to which both 
NP-attachment and VP-attachment can be used to identify the referent. Such a delay in setting on 
an object is thus expected. 
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explained by drawing upon the same principles that account for adult responses. 
Furthermore, the data suggest that it would be misleading to abandon this 
position. To see this, we need to look at children’s responses in the 2-Referent 
Context, as compared to the 1-Referent Context. First, whenever children selected 
the right frog in the 2-Referent Context – the one on the napkin -- they performed 
an incorrect sequence of actions just 10% of the time. The question is why these 
children did not misinterpret the following PP as destination of the VP put. As we 
have seen, Trueswell et al. argue that children who guessed right in the 2-Referent 
Context ignored the PP on the napkin, because the frog they had selected (by 
chance) was already on a napkin.  
Although this sounds plausible, there is some evidence against it. If it were 
true, then children could have made the same inference in the 1-Referent Context. 
Recall that in that context, there was a single frog, which was on a napkin, as well 
as an empty napkin. By parity of reasoning, the child subjects should have 
ignored the PP on the napkin in the 1-Referent Context just as often as the child 
subjects did in the 2-Referent Context, putting the only frog directly into the box, 
rather than on the empty napkin, on the grounds that it was already on a napkin. 
However, children moved the frog (from the napkin it was on) to the ‘empty’ 
napkin on 56% of the trials in the 1-Referent Context. To summarize, whenever 
children selected the right frog in the 2-Referent Context – the one that was on the 
napkin -- they produced ‘incorrect’ responses 10% of the time, by contrast 
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whenever children selected the only frog in the 1-Referent Context they produced 
incorrect responses 56% of the time. Clearly, this is a significant difference in 
behavior, which casts doubt on the proposal by Trueswell et al. that children who 
performed the right action ignored the PP on the napkin in the 2-Referent Context. 
For this reason, we will maintain the assumption that children who performed the 
right actions did so for the right reasons in the 2-Referent Context. This said, we 
now examine the behavior of children who did not perform the right action.  
Let us now examine the pattern of children’s non-adult actions in the 2-
Referent Context. There were three patterns of non-adult behavior, all involving 
the frog that was not on a napkin. First, children sometimes moved the frog that 
was not on a napkin onto the empty napkin without performing any further action. 
In other words, they ignored the content of the second PP into the box. Trueswell 
et al. (1999) call this error ‘falling short.’ Second, children sometimes moved the 
frog onto the empty napkin and then into the box. Trueswell et al. (1999) call this 
error ‘hopping’ Third, children sometimes performed two separate actions: first 
they moved the frog that was not on the napkin onto the empty napkin, and then 
they moved the frog that was initially on a napkin into the box. Trueswell et al. 
(1999) call this error ‘one of each.’ 
The critical observation is that children who performed an incorrect action 
chose the wrong frog – the one that was not on a napkin 90% of the trials. 
Contrary to what one might think at first sight, this response is not so naïve. In 
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fact, nothing in the context prevented children from making other mistakes, i.e., 
moving the right frog - the one that is already on the napkin - onto the empty 
napkin. 22We contend that, in the 2-Referent Context, children’s non-adult 
responses were due to a pragmatic inference and that the pragmatic inference was 
made in an attempt to individuate a uniquely salient frog, in compliance with the 
Principle of Referential Success.  
As we saw earlier, the main assumption underlying Trueswell et al. study 
is that garden path effect in the 2-Referent Context would denote insensitivity to 
the Principle of Referential Success. Moreover, Trueswell et al. (1999) mention 
only one scenario under which the presupposition of uniqueness associated with 
the use of the definite article the in Put the frog… could be satisfied in the 2-
Referent Context; this amounts to analyzing the PP on the napkin as the modifier 
of the preceding NP the frog. This is how Trueswell et al. (1999; p. 96) put it: 
 
“In this case, upon hearing “the frog,” a listener would not know 
which frog is being referred to, and should thus interpret the phrase ‘on the 
napkin,” as a Modifier.” 
 
                                                 
22 Proof of the fact that children could have moved the frog from the napkin it was on to the empty 
napkin comes from the fact that they often performed that kind of action in the 1-Referent 
Context. 
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In our view, this assumption is unwarranted. In fact, NP-attachment is not the 
only scenario under which the listener would know which frog should be moved. 
Under a VP-attachment scenario a simple pragmatic inference would also allow 
the listener to select a uniquely salient frog that should be moved. 
To introduce our critique, let us consider the Trueswell et al. scenario in 
more detail. The occurrence of the definite determiner the is crucial for the 
successful interpretation of the sentence. However, one could observe that besides 
the NP the frog, the definite determiner occurs in other positions in the sentence. 
In particular, we would like to focus on the NP the napkin which is part of the 
first PP. Even more interesting, is the observation that the experimental 
workspace, both in the 1-Referent and the 2-Referent Context, contains two 
identical napkins. This means that, if we follow the same logic entertained by 
Trueswell et al., upon hearing the fragment on the napkin children (as well as 
anybody adhering to the Principle of Referential Success) should be confused 
about which is the intended napkin to the same extent as they are in identifying 
the intended frog since no linguistic material can be used to identify a uniquely 
salient napkin. However, the results tell a different story. Children (and adults) do 
not experience any difficulties in identifying the relevant napkin: they always 
chose the empty napkin as the destination. The question is why children who 
apparently experience difficulty in identifying the intended frog do not experience 
any difficulty in identifying the intended napkin. Our proposal is that children 
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performed a pragmatic inference. The argument goes like this. As children hear 
the fragment Put the frog on the napkin… they know they have to move the frog 
on a napkin. Now, there are two napkins available but, since one of the napkins is 
already taken by another frog, they think the empty napkin is the intended one.  
If this reasoning is on the right track, Trueswell et al. must assume that 
children (and adults) make a reasonable pragmatic inference as to which napkin is 
the intended napkin. In doing this, they obey to the Principle of Referential 
Success according to which the interpretation that violates less presuppositions 
has to be chosen. Remarkably, if, as we just showed, children carried out a 
pragmatic inference in order to single out the intended napkin, one might wonder 
why children could not follow the same line of reasoning to identify the intended 
frog. Recall that, according to Trueswell et al., the only factor in the 2-referent 
context, which should lead children (and adults) to interpret the PP on the napkin 
as a modifier of the preceding NP the frog thus avoiding the garden path effect, is 
constituted by the presence of two identical frogs. As we have seen, however, 
children were able to use cues from the referential context to disentangle 
themselves from the infelicity of hearing the definite NP the napkin in presence of 
multiple napkins. With this in mind, we must consider the possibility that, contra 
Trueswell et al, interpreting the PP on the napkin as a modifier of the noun phrase 
the frog is not the only way to identify a unique entity in the discourse prior to 
hearing the disambiguating PP into the box. Another logical possibility would be, 
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in fact, to perform a pragmatic inference which could be triggered by the Principle 
of Referential Success. The story is simple. As children heard the sentence 
fragment Put the frog on the napkin…. they (implicitly) reasoned as follows: 
“The experimenter is asking me to put the frog on the napkin… But there are two 
frogs. Which one is she referring to? I know…, the one that is not already on a 
napkin.” Under this view, children were making a reasonable pragmatic inference 
that the experimenter’s intended referent for the NP the frog was clearly 
discernable in the context – it was the frog that was not already on a napkin. This 
pragmatic inference is carried out by children in accordance with the Principle of 
Referential Success which, in the case at hand, demands the identification of a 
unique frog. It is crucial to notice that this inference is possible only if the PP on 
the napkin is interpreted as a destination. Thus, children are expected to 
experience a garden-path when the second PP into the box occurs since another 
PP has received the destination Theta role. In sum, the application of a pragmatic 
inference together with children’s inability to revise their initial interpretation 
explains children’s non-adult actions.  
Let us consider the consequences of this hypothesis for the Trueswell et al. 
study. That study was based on the assumption that a garden path effect would be 
a sign of a failure to adhere to the Principle of Referential Success. However, as 
described above, it is possible that a garden path effect would follow from the 
adherence to the Principle of Referential Success.  
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In our view, the experimental findings reported by Trueswell et al. do not 
support the conclusion that children are less sensitive than adults to contextual 
factors in the resolution of ambiguities. In particular, we would like to contend 
that one of the contexts used in the Trueswell et al. experiment, the 2–Referent 
Context, might not constitute an appropriate context to evaluate children’s (or 
adults’) adherence to the Principle of Referential Success. As we have seen, in 
fact, children might have found another way to identify a unique frog in the 2-
Referent Context without resorting to the NP-attachment of the PP on the 
napkin—namely by performing a pragmatic inference which would ultimately 
lead them to choose the frog not on a napkin. If this is the case, the Principle of 
Referential Success could be satisfied either by VP-attachment or NP-attachment 
of the PP on the napkin in the 2-Referent Context. Moreover, children would 
show sensitivity to referential cues provided by the context as well as ability to 
perform pragmatic inferences. But we are only half way home. It remains to 
substantiate the hypothesis that children who selected the wrong frog (the one not 
on a napkin) did so because of a pragmatic inference. This is the topic of next 
chapter.  
Before we do that, however, we should explain why adults do not seem to 
experience problems in the 2-Referent Context. In fact, if we are assuming that 
the context is compatible with both NP-attachment and VP-attachment of the first 
PP on the napkin, this should exert an effect also on adults. Let us recall, that 
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adults commit very few mistakes in acting-out the given instruction in the 2-
Referent Context as well as in the 1-Referent Context, the context in which a 
garden-path at the occurrence of the second PP into the box is expected. This 
means that adults’ actions cannot be used to evaluate the effect of the referential 
context in resolving a temporary ambiguity occurring with the verb put followed 
by two PPs. The relevant evidence comes from the eye movement data reported 
by Trueswell et al., however. In particular, at the occurrence of the PP on the 
napkin, the analysis of adults’ eye movements show increased looked towards the 
empty napkin in the 1-Referent Context but not in the 2-Referent Context. This 
was taken by Trueswell et al. (1999) to mean that adults did not consider the 
empty napkin as a possible destination in the 2-Referent Context, thus they were 
not entertaining the VP-attachment of the PP on the napkin. In other words, adults 
were using contextual information, i.e., the fact that two identical frogs were 
present, early in the process of interpreting the sentence. However, we think that 
before drawing any conclusion about adults we should consider other factors that 
might have played a role. First of all, one has to take into consideration the fact 
that adults are generally better than children at taking tasks. Adults know they are 
being tested and often try to devise strategies to comply with the experimenter’s 
requests. In the case at hand, an act-out task relative to a simple visual display, 
one might wonder if adults might have ‘learned’ not to be mislead by the 
sentences along the way, for example by waiting till most of the information has 
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been uttered. In support of this hypothesis, we can offer two observations. First, 
the few errors in performance observed in adult’s behavior come from the first 
trial (trials) of the whole experiment23. This result is not surprising under the 
reasonable assumption that adults can be tricked (and thus commit mistakes) if 
caught off guard. However, adults are quick in realizing that they have been 
tricked and, as a consequence, in the following trials they develop a strategy in 
order to avoid committing the same mistake twice. One such strategy, as observed 
above, could have been for example the one to wait until enough information was 
provided. This strategy is likely to have been adopted by adults in the present 
experiment given that all the target sentences used involved the verb put followed 
by two prepositional phrases. To make things even more conspiring towards this 
possibility, the filler sentences used with adults involved the use of complex 
prepositional phrases such as Put the frog in between the napkin and the box. 
Sentences of that type necessarily lead the listener to wait till almost the end of 
the sentence before committing to any interpretation24. Indeed, and this is the 
second observation, the data show that adults did not converge on their final 
decision about which frog was the intended referent for the NP the frog till very 
late. Initially, the eye-movement data show, adults moved back and forth between 
the two frogs and then the longest time was spent on the frog not on the napkin. If 
                                                 
23 Trueswell’s personal communication to Stephen Crain. 
24 Filler sentences used with children were much simpler such as Put the frog here, now Put it 
back and so on.  
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the time spent on the frog not on the napkin could be interpreted as meaning that 
adults were considering that frog a better possible referent for the NP the frog in a 
sentence like Put the frog on the…, unfortunately we cannot say base on the data 
provided by Trueswell et al. (1999, but see also Tanenhaus et al. 1995 and Spivey, 
2002).25 What we can say, however, is that in order to understand how adults 
process sentences like Put the frog on the napkin into the box, an analysis of the 
first trial of the whole experiment with adults must be performed for each subject. 
Our prediction is that the eye- movement data for that trial would be very similar 
to the ones reported for children. As preliminary evidence, we conducted an act-
out task with 6 adults (mean age:…. ). Subjects were asked to act-out as soon as 
possible the sentence Put the frog on the napkin into the box relative to the 2-
Referent Context and they were tested on a singe trial. Out of 6 response actions 
performed by adults, 5 were incorrect. In particular 4 of the incorrect series were 
‘hopping errors’ in Trueswell et al. (1999) terminology. As for the fifth mistake 
we recorded, the subject selected the frog off the napkin ready to put it on the 
empty napkin. Then, he stopped with the frog in his hand at the occurrence of the 
second PP into the box; when he realized he had chosen the wrong. Again, this is 
                                                 
25 Incidentally, it is worth mentioning that eye movement data consistent with a garden path in the 
2-referent context were reported by Spivey et al. (2002). The authors of that study argue against 
this interpretation of the data on the basis of a third condition (including three frogs off the 
napkin). We will elaborate on our own explanation as to why a garden path is expected in the 2-
Referent Context in the next chapter. For the time-being, we can only say that according to our 
proposal the difference between the 2-referent context and the Several Frogs-Referent Context 
documented by Spivey et al. (2002) will turn out to be irrelevant in order to rule out the possibility 
that a garden path actually occurs in the 2-Referent Context. 
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a ‘mistake’ that children in the Trueswell et al. study also produced.  
To conclude, although further examination is needed before drawing any 
conclusion, it seems reasonable to assume that children and adults are not so 
different after all. Adults are just better test-takers and are able to wait till they 
have all the relevant information before committing to an interpretation after 
being misled once. Children do not wait. Adults, as children, know that either frog 
in the 2-referent context could serve as referent for the NP the frog. Adults’ 
selection of the relevant frog is not resolved until very late in the sentence and, 
even more telling is the observation that the wrong frog (the frog off the napkin) 
is considered for a longer time than the right frog (the frog on the napkin) early 
on. As we briefly mentioned in the previous section, both children’s and adults’ 
behavior is expected under the assumption that in the 2-Referent Context the 
computation of a pragmatic inference allows the listener to individuate the 
referent for the NP the frog without recurring to NP attachment. This leads us to 
the next chapter.  
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Chapter III 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter II introduced the study by Trueswell et al. (1999), which was designed to 
assess children’s sensitivity to the referential context in processing sentences that 
contain a local ambiguity. Our main observation was that the relevant context 
employed by Trueswell et al. - the 2-Referent Context - was probably not the 
most appropriate experimental context if the goal was to evaluate children’s (or 
adults’) sensitivity to the Principle of Referential Success. Briefly, we argued that, 
contra Trueswell et al., in the 2-Referent Context children were probably able to 
identify the experimenter’s intended referent for the NP the frog for the relevant 
fragment of sentences like Put the frog on the napkin into the box, while 
entertaining the VP-attachment interpretation of the PP on the napkin. In 
particular, given that only one of the two frogs in the context was on a napkin, 
children were invited to make a pragmatic inference that the intended referent for 
the NP the frog (to put on the napkin) was the frog which was not already on a 
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napkin. In order to evaluate whether this hypothesis is on the right track, we 
conducted an Act-Out task. 
 
 
3.2 ‘On’ or ‘Off’ the napkin 
 
In this section we put to test our claim that children in the Trueswell et al. study 
were carrying out a pragmatic inference in order to identify the intended referent 
of the definite NP the frog in the 2-Referent Context. As noted in the previous 
paragraph, when children made incorrect responses in the 2-Referent Context, 
they chose the wrong frog 90% of the time. We hypothesized that children’s non-
adult behavior was due to a pragmatic inference they made, which did not violate 
the Principle of Referential Success. The pragmatic inference enabled children to 
identify a uniquely salient referent for the NP the frog in the experimental 
workspace. Upon hearing the fragment Put the frog on the napkin… children 
inferred that the unique referent of the NP the frog was the one that was not 
already on a napkin. In the next section, we present an experiment designed to 
evaluate this hypothesis.  
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3.2.1. Experiment I 
 
This experiment used contexts like the one depicted in Figure 1 below, which 
includes two frogs. One frog is on a napkin, the other frog is not. In addition, 
there is an empty napkin in the experimental workspace. We call this the on/off 
Context because the two frogs can be distinguished in virtue of being on or off a 
napkin. There is no other object in the picture (i.e., no box, as compared to the 2-
Referent Context of the Trueswell et al. study) because the presence of another 
object is irrelevant for the purpose of the present experiment. The reason is 
simple: we want to evaluate if children could identify which frog should be 
moved when entertaining the destination interpretation of the PP, the only 
possible interpretation in the case at end. In fact, if, as claimed by Trueswell et al., 
the presence of two identical frogs in the 2-Referent Context should prevent 
children from successfully identifying the referent of the NP the frog upon 
hearing it, (thus triggering the modifier interpretation of the first PP on the 
napkin), children should be confused as to which frog is the intended referent in 
the on/off Context (where NP-attachments of the PP is not an option). By contrast 
if, as we suggested, children are nevertheless capable of singling out a unique 
frog, by means of the pragmatic inference described above, they should not be 
confused. More precisely, our experimental hypothesis is that, in response to (1), 
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children’s predominant response would be to move the frog that is not already on 
a napkin and to put it on the empty napkin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   Figure 1: The on/off Context 
 
Children were presented with contexts similar to the one depicted in Figure 1 and 
were given instructions like (1). 
 
(1) Put the frog on the napkin. 
 
Fifteen children participated in the experiment. They ranged in age from 3;10 to 
5;9, (mean age: 4;7). In this experiment, children were told that Kermit the Frog, a 
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puppet manipulated by one of the experimenters, had a special project and needed 
the child’s help. Then, while the puppet was entertaining the child, the other 
experimenter arranged the toys in the experimental workspace (as illustrated in 
Figure 1). Before each trial, the experimenter ensured that the child knew the 
names of each object. If the child had a non-standard name for an object, the 
name offered by the child was used by the experimenter thereafter in referring to 
the object. By no means did the experimenter’s description of the characters 
biased children towards believing that one of the object was misplaced and 
needed to be moved somewhere else in the context. Children were tested using an 
act-out task. In this task, the experimenter instructed the child subject to act out 
(“Do what we say”) a sentence using the toys available in the experimental 
workspace. Each child was presented with four target trials, four fillers and one 
warm-up. All and only the target trials were instructions containing the verb put 
as illustrated in (1). 
As predicted, children moved the frog that was not already on a napkin 
and put it on the empty napkin 92% of the time (44 out of 48 trials). It is worth 
noting that children never asked the experimenter which frog? they should move. 
Moreover, when they were asked, at the very last trial, to explain why they had 
moved the frog not on a napkin, they consistently answered “because that one was 
already on a napkin.” We interpret the findings as confirming our hypothesis that 
children could make a pragmatic inference in the 2-Referent Context in the 
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Trueswell et al. study, in order to single out a salient frog, as dictated by the 
Principle of Referential Success. Crucially, this pragmatic inference takes place 
when the PP on the napkin is attached to the VP; the scenario that would create a 
garden path effect in a sentence like Put the frog on the napkin into the box. This 
means that one cannot use the occurrence of a garden-path effect to conclude that 
the Principle of Referential Success has not been adhered to. 
 To sum up, last chapter described an experiment conducted by Trueswell 
et al. (1999) in order to evaluate children’s sensitivity to referential cues in 
resolving temporary syntactic ambiguities in sentences like Put the frog on the 
napkin into the box. The findings from that study led the authors to conclude that 
children are not as sensitive as adults to the referential context. After a scrutiny of 
the data reported, we highlighted a potential problem with the context of the main 
experiment, the 2-Referent Context. According to the authors, the 2-Referent 
Context, by virtue of containing two frogs, supports the interpretation of the PP 
on the napkin as modifier of the noun phrase the frog, this being the only way to 
identify the referent of the NP the frog. We noticed, however, that in the 2-
Referent Context, there is no need to appeal to a modifier interpretation in order 
to identify one salient frog, despite the presence of two frogs. The same goal 
could be achieved under the VP-attachment scenario by performing a pragmatic 
inference, which would ultimately lead children to select the frog that is not on 
the napkin. An experiment showing that this is possible has been reported. As a 
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consequence, given that a pragmatic inference could be responsible in part for 
children’s non-adult behavior, the Principle of Referential Success is not at issue. 
It follows that in order to draw conclusions on children’ observance of the 
Principle of Referential Success, a different context should be employed –namely 
one for which a pragmatic inference won’t be as readily available. Finding such a 
context is the main goal of the present chapter. In order to do this, we first need to 
study in more detail the nature of the pragmatic inference we are appealing to.  
 
 
3.3 A felicitous command 
 
The pragmatic inference under consideration in the present chapter is related to 
the conversational setting, namely conversations in which children respond to 
someone’s verbal instructions to perform certain actions. In particular, this kind of 
conversational setting was employed in the Trueswell at al. (1999) study, and in 
our Experiment I. The proposal here is that the nature of this task can, in part, 
explain children’s willingness to compute a pragmatic inference.  
 As noted earlier, in an act-out task the experimenter asks the child to 
perform an action by means of a command or request. In general, it is assumed 
that every time a sentence is uttered there are some conditions that must be 
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satisfied in order for the sentence to be ‘situational appropriate.’ These conditions 
may be called felicity conditions. Felicity conditions dictate the circumstances in 
which it is appropriate to ask questions, give commands, and so forth. Before we 
discuss the felicity conditions associated with commands, it is useful to consider 
different conversational settings. 
Many linguistic constructions have been argued to be associated with 
felicity conditions. A relevant example is (the use of) negative sentences. As 
observed by Wason (1972), a sentence containing negation is felicitous, and 
therefore it is easier to process, if it is used to refute an expectation that has been 
established in the prior discourse context (see Horn 1989, Ch. 3 for a review). For 
example, sentence (2) is felicitous if presented after (3), as in (4): 
 
(2) 1 is not an even number. 
 
(3) 2 is an even number. 
 
(4) 2 is an even number. 1 is not an even number 
 
It was argued by Stalnaker (1999) that even positive assertions are associated with 
felicity conditions in conversational exchanges. Stalnaker (1999, p.78) states that 
“assertions affect, and are intended to affect the context.” The context at issue is 
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the conversational or discourse context. According to Stalnaker (1999) assertive 
propositions can be uttered felicitously only if the message they convey is not part 
of the common ground (context set) at the time of the utterance, since assertive 
propositions are intended to add to the common ground as the conversation 
progresses26. As the conversation progresses, new propositions are added to the 
common ground. So at each stage during a conversation, the common ground 
contains a set of coherent and connected propositions. Among the principles that 
regulate the interaction of assertions and the common ground, Stalnaker (1999; 
p.88) introduces the principle in (5):  
 
(5) A proposition asserted is always true in some but not all of the possible 
worlds in the context set. 
 
As (5) makes clear, a speaker is not expected to assert a proposition that is already 
part of the common ground (i.e., true in all possible worlds of the context set). If a 
speaker violates this rule, he has done “something that, from the point of view of 
the conversation, was unreasonable, inefficient, disorderly, or uncooperative” 
(Stalnaker, 1999; p.89).  
 The appropriate use of questions is also associated with some felicity 
conditions. We could see a question as an attempt by the speaker to enrich the set 
                                                 
26 For Stalnaker the common ground is the set of beliefs or assumptions shared by the participants 
engaged in a conversation (see also Heim, 1982). 
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of propositions in the common ground. Therefore, a question is “unreasonable, 
inefficient, disorderly, uncooperative,” if its answer is already contained in the 
common ground. In particular, if someone asks a question, it is reasonable to 
assume that (a) he does not know the answer to that question, (b) he wants to 
know the answer to the question and (c) he thinks the hearer is able to provide 
such answer.  
Going back to commands, here is a general set of felicity conditions that 
must be satisfied (Austin, 1962): 
 
(6) S requests H to do A (action) 
a.  Speaker believes that A has not yet been done. 
b.   Speaker believes that Hearer is able to do A. 
c. Speaker believes that the hearer is willing to do A-type things  
d. S wants A to be done. 
 
We focus on the first condition (6)a listed above. Crucially, for our purposes, it 
follows from (6)a that a cooperative speaker will utter a command only if the state 
of affairs described by the command does not hold at the time of the command. 
From the point of view of the hearer, when a command is given, the hearer will 
make any reasonable inference that will allow him to regard the speaker as being 
cooperative. In particular, the hearer will attempt to interpret the command such 
 
 70
that the state of affairs that will hold after the command has been executed does 
not yet hold.  
 
 
3.4 Commands and Uniqueness 
 
The previous section introduced the notion of ‘felicity condition’ and provided 
examples of linguistic constructions whose appropriate use depends on the 
satisfaction of some felicity conditions. In particular, our interest resides on the 
felicity conditions associated with requests/commands, since the task children had 
to carry out in the studies under consideration required them to comply with a 
request to perform a certain action. There is indeed something peculiar about 
commands. The relevant intuition is that the felicity conditions imposed by a 
command lead can sometimes led to a consistent and specific interpretation of an 
otherwise vague or unspecified expression. To clarify this, consider the following 
example from Lyons (1999; p.14): 
 
(7) Context: in a room with three doors, one of which is open  
 Close the door, please. 
 
The sentence in (7) is perfectly fine despite there being three doors in the 
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conversational context. The intended referent for the NP the door is easily 
identified: it is the open door. Given the nature of commands, the listener infers 
that he is expected to perform an action whose ultimate goal is to make the state 
of affairs described by the command – which presently does not hold – to be 
instantiated. The listener also infers that the speaker believes he, the listener, is in 
a position to perform such an action. Since one can only close a door that is not 
yet closed, the listener infers that the intended referent for the NP the door is the 
only door which is not closed. Once again, the contrast between the state of affairs 
requested by the command and the state of affairs which holds when the 
command is uttered helps the listener in identifying the referent for the definite 
determiner. In fact, despite the presence of multiple doors, one can reasonably 
claim that only one door serves as the referent for the NP the door. In other 
words, the listener can identify the referent of the definite NP in a way that 
satisfies the presupposition of uniqueness associated with the use of a definite 
determiner. Support for this idea comes from the fact that the acceptability of (7) 
actually decreases if the definite NP is replaced by an indefinite NP as in (8), in 
the same context.  
 
(8) Close a door, please 
 
The difference in acceptability between (8) and (7) can be explained if we assume 
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that ‘a uniquely (salient)’ door is indeed identified in the context under discussion. 
Thus, the use of the indefinite article, which does not presuppose the existence of 
a unique referent, is not felicitous.27 
So far, we have shown that commands can lead to the satisfaction of the 
presupposition of uniqueness by means of a pragmatic inference ultimately 
motivated by the desire to obey a command. However, in the example examined 
so far another explanation is available. It could be supposed that the form of the 
linguistic construction is irrelevant and that the presupposition of uniqueness is 
somehow met just because there is exactly one door in the context that can be 
singled out among the set of doors - in virtue of being open. On this view, the fact 
that one door in the context has a unique property - the property of being open - 
which is not shared by the other doors, serves to satisfy the uniqueness 
presupposition of the definite determiner, not the felicity conditions associated 
with a command. To adjudicate between the two explanations, consider the 
sentence in (9): 
 
(9) The door is open/not closed. 
 
Sentence (9) is an assertion which contains the definite NP the door as did 
example (7). Furthermore, the property predicated of the definite NP the door is 
                                                 
27 The infelicity follows from a failure to obey the Principle of Maximize Presuppositions that we 
will introduce in Chapter V. 
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the one used in (7), the property of being open, and again this property 
distinguishes one door from the other doors in the context under consideration. 
However, notice that (9) is less acceptable than (7) in the context, despite the 
presence of a unique door that has the property predicated in the assertion. To 
convey the same meaning, a speaker would probably use an existential 
construction, as in (10), or an indefinite NP, as in (11): 
 
(10) There’s a door open. 
 
(11) One/a door is open. 
 
Given the facts illustrated above, we will assume that the felicity conditions 
associated with commands can be used to select the referent of a definite NP.28 We 
have established that it is a prerequisite for commands that the state of affairs 
described by the predicate is not yet true of the denotation of the relevant NP. If 
there is only one entity in the context for which the command could be 
felicitously uttered, then that entity becomes the referent of the definite NP. What 
is important is not the mere presence of a unique entity in the context to serve as a 
referent for the NP, rather it is the fact that there should be a unique entity that 
                                                 
28 Commands are not the only speech acts that can trigger the kind of pragmatic inference under 
consideration. A similar effect is obtained with sentences like I wish the door was closed, I am 
glad the door is open etc. 
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could serve as a referent for the NP and for which the command could be 
felicitously uttered. In the case under consideration, it does not matter if there is 
more than one door in the context (i.e., more than one referent for the NP the 
door), what matters is that the command could apply felicitously to only one 
entity, namely someone could only close a door if that door is not already closed. 
 A command demands a contrast between the state of affairs that has to be 
achieved and the state of affair which already holds. This contrast is what 
motivates the pragmatic inference. This said, one could interpret the command in 
(7) here reported as (12), as in (13). 
 
(12) Close the door. 
 
(13) Close the door [that is not closed yet] 
 
Put it another way, a simple assertion like the one in (9), here reported as (14), 
does not highlight the contrast between the present state of affairs and the future 
(possible) one, simply because no action is required: the main goal of (14), is in 
fact to attribute a property to the entity denoted by the NP. As a consequence, 
interpreting (14) in analogy with (13) gives rise to a tautology, as shown in (15): 
 
(14) The door is open/not closed. 
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(15) The door [that is open/not closed] is open/not closed  
 
The contrast between what the speaker wants to achieve by means of the 
command itself and what holds prior to the utterance of the command is what 
makes the use of a definite NP possible, and maybe even felicitous. However, not 
all the predicates establish an ‘evident’ contrast so straightforwardly as the 
predicate closed. A command like Close the door can be uttered out of the blue in 
a room with only one open door (among several doors), because the contrast 
between what is closed and what is open, is observable in the context. In other 
words, no previous mentioning of ‘that door’ is necessary for the listener to 
identify the intended referent of the door. The same, however, does not hold for 
other kind of predicates that require more interpretative effort on the part of the 
listener.  
 
(16) Context:[ three papers which have been read – one paper which has not 
been read] 
 Read the paper. 
 
(17) Context: [three kittens which have been touched– one kitty which has not 
been touched] 
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 Touch the kitten. 
 
(18) Context: [a room with three heaters that have been felt – one heater which 
has not been felt] 
 Feel the heater 
 
The predicates contained in sentences (16)-(18) all express properties that are less 
clearly observable than the property of being closed. It is hard to think of 
observable signs which could mark a paper as read, a kitten as touched or a heater 
as felt. Furthermore, even if one knew which paper was read, which kitty was 
touched and which heater was felt, nothing would prevent the listener from 
assuming that the relevant action can be repeated with the same object. As a 
consequence, the use of a definite NP with these predicates would be more 
problematic from the point of view of the listener. Commands like (16) through 
(18) are infelicitous if uttered out of the blue, without prior discussion of the 
entity referred to by the definite NP. Although the predicates used in commands 
like (16) - (18) set up a contrast between entities in the context that have the 
property expressed by the predicate and entities that do not have that property 
(yet), this contrast is not directly observable. Thus, any pragmatic inference that 
ultimately relies upon the contrast described above is unlikely to be made. 
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 To sum up, we have focused our attention on the felicity conditions 
associated with commands. We have also highlighted that, because of the felicity 
conditions associated with commands, a definite NP could be used in a command 
even if the presupposition of uniqueness is not satisfied in the context. In fact, as 
we illustrated, the contrast implicit in commands between what has to be achieved 
in response to of the command itself and what holds when the command is 
uttered, is a cue that can be used to identify the intended referent for the definite 
NP. This ultimately is what makes it possible to carry out a particular pragmatic 
inference. Let us now illustrate how this line of reasoning could be applied to 
sentences like (19), which are the focus of the present study. In the experiment we 
presented in section 4.2, children were given the instruction in (19) relative to the 
On/off Context (Figure 2): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               Figure 2: the On/off Context 
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(19) Put the frog on the napkin 
 
Spelling out the felicity conditions associated with the request in (19) (from the 
point of view of the child subject) yields something like the following: 
 
(20) Child: The request is for me to ‘Put the frog on the napkin’  
a.  the state of affairs described by the fragment ‘the frog (is) on the 
napkin,’ must not yet hold  
b.  the speaker believes I can perform the requested action. 
c. the speaker wants me to do it. 
 
The pertinent point is (20)a. After incorporating the presupposition of uniqueness 
triggered by the use of the definite article, this condition directs the child to 
execute an action such that, only after the child’s action is performed, ‘the 
(uniquely salient) frog is on the (uniquely salient) napkin’ (which frog and which 
napkin to act upon remains to be determined). It is crucial for condition (20)a that 
the state of affairs in which ‘the (uniquely salient) frog is on the (uniquely salient) 
napkin’ does not yet hold.29 In addition, the verb put together with the preposition 
                                                 
29 As we illustrated in Chapter II, the choice of a uniquely salient napkin is not as trivial as one 
might think, given the presence of two identical napkins in the context. Another pragmatic 
inference has to be assumed, in fact, for deciding which the intended referent for the NP the 
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on behaves as the verb close in that the contrast between what has been put on 
something and what has not is evident in the context. It does not matter if there is 
more than one frog in the context, what matters is that the command could apply 
felicitously to only one frog, namely the one that has not been put on a napkin yet. 
Given this assumption, the command would be infelicitous if the speaker intended 
the frog that is already on a napkin to be moved.. This explains why, as we saw, 
children inferred that the frog to be moved on the napkin was the frog that was not 
already on a napkin despite the presence of two identical frogs in Experiment I 
and in the Trueswell et al. study. 
Let us now examine the pragmatic inference that we are proposing in 
more detail. We have suggested that in Experiment I and in the 2-Referent 
Context of the Trueswell et al. experiment, children found a way to identify the 
speaker’s intended referent for the definite NP the frog, despite the presence of 
two frogs. Evidently, children inferred that the frog to be moved was the one not 
already on a napkin. However, as we pointed out previously, another inference 
had to be made in the 2-Referent Context (as well as in the On/off Context of our 
experiment): a uniquely salient napkin also had to be identified despite the 
presence of two identical napkins in the experimental setting.  
 
                                                                                                                                     
napkin is. This gives rise to a complication about the order in which the two pragmatic inferences, 
each of them relative to each definite determiner in the sentence are carried over. We will address 
this issue later in this chapter. 
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                                                         Figure 3 
 
As a matter of record, children never selected the napkin (i.e., napkin 2) 
that already contained a frog as a destination in executing the action 
corresponding to the phrase Put the frog on the napkin. The question, then, is why 
children selected the empty napkin as the intended referent of the second NP the 
napkin. This was the object selected by children in both the Trueswell et al. study 
and in Experiment I. In analogy with the proposal we just made about children’s 
inference about the speaker’s intended referent for the NP the frog, we propose 
that children chose the empty napkin as the referent of the NP the napkin, on the 
grounds that the empty napkin did not contain any frog. Roughly the child would 
reason like this: I know I have to move this frog on a napkin but there are two 
napkins in the context…which one should I consider?.. I know, the one that does 
not yet have a frog on it!”. Things are not so simple, however, because once 
children selected the napkin without a frog (napkin1), the other frog – the frog 
2 
1 
2 1
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already on a napkin (frog2) — could also be considered as a potential referent. 
Although that frog was already on a napkin (napkin2), it was not on the napkin 
which does not have any frog (napkin1). In other words, suppose the child has 
decided that the intended destination is the empty napkin (napkin1), now she has 
to decide which frog to move on that napkin. The child could reason that ‘I have 
to move a frog on the empty napkin (napkin1), it must be the frog that is not 
already on that napkin…. However, both frogs are not on napkin 1.” At this point 
the pragmatic inference which could be used to identify the intended frog reaches 
an impasse. As a result, the child should not know which frog to move. 
This scenario illustrates the problem one would face if he already knew 
the intended referent for the definite NP the napkin. Let us now consider a 
scenario in which the child knows the intended referent for the first NP the frog. 
Suppose that the child has decided which frog to move: it is the one not on a 
napkin (frog1). The second step will be for the child to select the intended referent 
for the definite NP the napkin. He could reason as follows: “Okey, I have to move 
this frog (frog1) on the napkin….which napkin?” Again, there are two napkins 
this frog (frog1) could be moved to! Once again the child would not know what to 
do.  
In short, the problem illustrated here is due to the fact that we are 
appealing to the same mechanism, a pragmatic inference, to identify the referents 
for the two definite NPs contained in the sentence. The result of applying the 
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relevant pragmatic inference to identify the intended referent for one definite NP, 
whichever that is, affects the possibility of finding the intended referent for the 
other. A way out could be to make the result of the application of the pragmatic 
inference for one definite NP irrelevant for the other definite NP. In other words 
we could propose the child performs a pragmatic inference of the kind described 
below: 
 
(21) a.  the frog = the frog that is not an any napkin 
b.  the napkin = the napkin which does not have any frog 
 
Regardless of which napkin has been selected, the inference in (21)a would allow 
one to identify the intended referent for the NP the frog. In same way, regardless 
of which frog has been selected, the inference in (21)b would make it possible to 
identify a referent for the NP the napkin. 
Our assumption exploits the intuition that when there are two 
contextually dependent elements in a sentence, these elements are not resolved 
one as a function of the other, rather they are analyzed independently. A natural 
question is whether anything of this sort is exemplified in different cases. It seems 
that one such case is the following: 
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                                                      Figure 4 
 
(22) Give him the apple.  
 
Suppose somebody is given the instruction in (22) relative to the context depicted 
in Figure 4. It is reasonable to assume that when asked to perform (22) subjects 
would give the apple that is unclaimed to the boy who dopes not have any apple. 
In order to execute the instruction in (22), one has to identify first, the referent of 
the pronoun ‘him’, and second, the referent of the definite NP the apple. Notice 
that, as illustrated before, the two referential expressions cannot be interpreted as 
dependent one from one other. In fact, if the pronoun (the receiver) is identified 
first (is the boy who has not been given anything yet), both apples would be 
possible referents for the NP the apple. Similarly, if the definite NP (what is 
given) is identified first, (it is the apple that has not been given to anybody) then 
both boys could be the receivers of that apple. The solution would be once again 
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to assume that the process of interpreting two referential expressions by means of 
applying a pragmatic inference is a two step process: one step being independent 
from the other. Unfortunately, we have nothing to offer as to why this constraint 
should hold.  
 A possible way out of this impasse is to assume that the visual display 
readily suggests that each frog is in a unique relation with one napkin. In a sense, 
a sentence like Put the frog on the napkin in presence of that display is equivalent 
to Put the frog on its napkin. Thus the listener’s task is to find the uniquely salient 
frog such that that frog is not on its napkin. The idea is that the visual display 
suggests a series of pairings between frogs and napkins, such that the listener does 
not have to look for a uniquely salient frog and a uniquely salient napkin, but 
rather for a uniquely salient pair frog-napkin for which the state of affairs 
requested by the command does not hold at the time of the utterance 
 It is time to take stock. So far we have illustrated how children compute a 
pragmatic inference to identify the speaker’s intended referent for a definite NP in 
situations in which the uniqueness requirement is not strictly satisfied. Our claim 
is that the notion of felicity condition associated with the command is the 
triggering cue for the pragmatic inference. The felicity condition leads the hearer 
to assume a contrast between the state of affairs that holds at the time the 
command is uttered and the desired state of affair. The present discussion, 
however, should not make us lose track of our main objectives. In the previous 
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chapter we contended that the experimental setting employed in the Trueswell et 
al. study does not necessarily support the conclusion that children do not appeal to 
contextual cues in order to resolve correctly (NP-attachment) a temporary 
ambiguity like the one in Put the frog on the napkin into the box. To be more 
specific, in a context with two frogs, the assignment of NP-attachment of the PP 
on the napkin is not the only way for children to identify the intended referent for 
the definite NP the frog, as supposed by Trueswell et al.. An alternative 
mechanism was proposed, a pragmatic inference. This mechanism depends on the 
properties of the objects in the context and on the conditions on the use of a 
particular kind of speech acts: commands. If we are on the right track, children are 
much more knowledgeable than they have been credit for in previous work.  
 In the rest of the chapter, we will examine the nature of the pragmatic 
inference by children in more detail. On the account we have advanced, the 
inference takes place when the PP on the napkin is attached to the VP. Two 
factors play a role. First, children interpret the PP on the napkin as a destination of 
the putting event. Thus, one should investigate what factors would prevent 
children from attaching the PP to the verb. Second, given a VP attachment parse, 
children carry out a pragmatic inference. Thus, one should investigate under 
which conditions such a pragmatic inference could be inhibited. These are the 
topics of the remainder of this chapter. We start with the latter. 
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3.5 Semantic constraints on the pragmatic inference 
 
In this section we investigate semantic constraints on the pragmatic inference 
about the speaker’s intended referent for definite NPs. We would suggest that the 
semantic structure of the target sentence plays a role in deciding whether children 
compute a pragmatic inference about the speaker’s intended referent for definite 
NPs in expressions like Put the frog on the napkin. In particular, we would like to 
argue that if the instruction is changed to something like (23), children’s 
responses may vary, possibly depending on whether the adjective ADJ is 
interpreted as appositive or as contrastive. 
 
(23) Put the frog on the ADJ napkin. 
 
For example, if the adjective is interpreted as a contrastive adjective, then children 
will carry out a pragmatic inference along the lines of (24). By contrast, if 
children interpret the adjective as appositive, then children will attempt to carry 
out a pragmatic inference along the lines in (25). 
 
(24) Put the frog that is not on a ADJ. napkin on the ADJ. empty napkin. 
 
 
 87
(25) Put the frog that is not on a napkin on the empty napkin, which happens to 
be ADJ. 
 
Before we illustrate our proposal with an example, we review previous work on 
the use and interpretation of adjectives, which points to an interesting difference 
in the processing of scalar and color adjectives with adults. 
 One study was conducted by Sedivy (2005). The experiment was an 
elicited production task to examine the pattern of production of adjectives in 
contexts with and without a referential contrast between two objects of the same 
kind. The goal of the experiment was to determine whether participants would 
produce scalar and color adjectives to refer to the target object. The results show 
that adult speakers of English use color adjectives regardless of whether a 
referential contrast was involved. By contrast, scalar adjectives are almost never 
produced in contexts without a corresponding contrast. 
A comprehension study was also conducted by Sedivy, Tanenhaus, 
Chambers and Carlson (1996) and Sedivy (2001). The study showed that color 
adjectives (e.g., blue), as compared to scalar adjectives (e.g., tall, big), are not 
interpreted contrastively. For example, in a series of eye-tracking experiments by 
Sedivy et al. (1996), subjects were shown displays with four objects, and they 
were instructed to move various objects. One set of instructions contained scalar 
adjectives, such as Pick up the tall glass. The finding was that subjects identified 
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the target object (the tall glass in the display) from a competitor object (an object 
that could have been described using the same adjective tall) more quickly when a 
contrasting object of the same category of the target object (a short glass in the 
display) was present, as compared to trials that did not contain a contrasting 
object. The findings were interpreted as evidence that participants systematically 
used the contrastive interpretation of prenominal scalar adjectives. For present 
purposes, the relevant finding is that color adjectives were not found to exhibit the 
same contrastive function (as scalar terms) in similar contexts (Sedivy, 2001). For 
example, when presented with a display containing different objects and asked to 
Pick up the blue cup, the presence in the display of a contrastive object (a red cup) 
did not facilitate the identification of the target object. 
With past research in mind, we assume that scalar adjectives tend to have 
a contrastive interpretation whereas color adjective tend to have an appositive 
interpretation. Thus, it is possible that upon encountering a sentence like (26) 
children will interpret the instruction as in (27). Crucially, this is an instruction 
that can be carried out in a context like the one depicted in Figure 6, since that 
figure contains a frog that is on the small napkin and a frog that is not. 
 
(26) Put the frog on the small napkin. 
 
(27) Put the frog that is not on any small napkin on the small empty napkin. 
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                                     Figure 6 – The Scalar Adj. context 
 
By contrast, upon encountering a sentence like (28) children can interpret the 
instruction as in (29). Importantly, this is an instruction that cannot be carried out 
in a context like the one depicted in Figure 7, since in that figure both frogs are 
already on a napkin. 
 
(28) Put the frog on the red napkin. 
 
(29) Put the frog that is not on any napkin on the empty napkin, which happens 
to be red. 
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         Figure 7: The Color Adj. Context 
 
3.5.1 Experiment II 
 
To evaluate this hypothesis we conducted an Act-out task. The experiment had 
two conditions: the Scalar Adjective Condition and the Color Adjective 
Condition. In the Scalar Adjective condition, a group of 15 children (age from 
3;09 to 5;4 - mean age: 4;8) were presented with a context with two frogs, each 
one on a napkin of a different size -- one big and one small. In addition, there was 
an empty small napkin, as illustrated in Figure 7. Children were given 
instructions, such as (30).  
 
 
 
Blue
Red Red 
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(30) Put the frog on the small napkin. 
 
(31) Put the frog that is not on the small napkin on the small empty napkin. 
 
Our prediction was that children would interpret (30) as an invitation to carry out 
the instruction in (31). As a consequence, children would be able to perform a 
pragmatic inference. They will move the frog that is not already on a small napkin 
and put it on the small empty napkin. 
In the Color Adjective Condition, a different group of 15 children (age 
from 3;10 to 5;8- mean age: 4;7) were presented with a context with two frogs, 
each one on a napkin of a different color -- one red and one blue. In addition, 
there was an empty red napkin as illustrated in Figure 7. Children were given 
instructions, such as (32). 
 
(32) Put the frog on the red napkin. 
 
(33) Put the frog that is not on the napkin on the empty napkin, which happens 
to be red. 
 
Our prediction was that in this condition children would interpret (32) as a request 
to carry out the instruction paraphrased in (33). Thus children would not be able 
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to perform a pragmatic inference, given the fact that both frogs are already on a 
napkin. 
As expected, all of the children tested in the Scalar Adjective condition 
experienced no difficulty in identifying which frog in the experimental workspace 
should be moved. Children moved the frog that was not on the small napkin onto 
the small (empty) napkin 90% of the time. Interestingly, children never asked 
“which frog?”. By contrast, the children tested in the Color Adjective Condition 
experienced difficulty in identifying the intended referent of the initial NP the 
frog. In the first two trials, children consistently displayed confusion, and queried 
the experimenter about “which frog?” to move on 18 out of 24 trials.3031 To that 
question the experimenter replied by saying: the one you want or which one do 
you think? To which the child reacted usually by developing a strategy (i.e., 
moving the object closer to them). Over all of the trials, moreover, children 
behaved at chance in selecting one of the two frogs to move. Interestingly, in the 
last trial children were asked to explain the reason for selecting the frog they had 
moved on that trial; children consistently answered “it doesn’t matter” or “it’s the 
same.” This also contrasts with the findings of Experiment I, where children 
consistently carried out a pragmatic inference and explained that they had selected 
                                                 
30 The 24 trials under consideration correspond to the first two trials for each child. 
31 These results also bear on the interpretation of Experiment I. As the reader may recall, in that 
experiment children performed a specific action. One might wonder whether in that experiment 
children could have behaved in any different way. The results of the present experiment show that, 
when presented with a command children can indeed question the experimenter’s intentions. 
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the frog that was not on a napkin on the grounds that the other frog was already 
on a napkin.  
 
 
3.6 Syntactic constraints on the pragmatic inference 
 
As we have seen, there is a general preference for VP-attachment for the PP on 
the napkin in a sentence like Put the frog on the napkin (into the box). As we saw, 
many accounts have been offered to explain this preference. For instance, Frazier 
(1978; 1987)32 claimed that VP-attachment is to be preferred over NP-attachment 
because the syntactic structure associated with VP-attachment is simpler (by 
virtue of containing less syntactic nodes). The parser will thus prefer the simpler 
structure in an attempt to reduce memory load. Other proposals draw upon the 
notion of thematic roles assigned by predicates. For example, according to some 
authors the parser prefers to fill the theta grid of a predicate as soon as possible, 
leaving as few unassigned theta roles as possible (e.g. Pritchett, 1988, 1992; 
Gibson, 1991; Weinberg, 1992). 
This line of research draws upon the lexical properties of the verb put. In 
fact, the verb put obligatorily assigns three theta roles, an Agent, a Theme and a 
Destination role. For the purposes of the present study, we can consider only the 
                                                 
32 But see also Kimball (1973) 
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Theme and the Destination Theta roles. These theta roles are usually realized by a 
noun phrase and a prepositional phrase, respectively. Thus, in interpreting the 
string Put the frog on the napkin the parser assigns the Theme theta role to the NP 
the frog and it assigns the Destination theta role to the PP on the napkin. Having 
discharged the theta roles associated with the verb, the string can constitute a 
complete utterance. As a consequence, the listener attempts to carry out the 
instruction associated with the string in accordance with the parse that is being 
entertained (VP-attachment of the PP). If this reasoning is on the right track, then 
a different parse of the string would give rise to a different instruction. This result 
could be achieved by considering, for example, a verb which does not necessarily 
assigned a Destination Theta role. One such verb could be move.  
 
3.6.1 Experiment III 
 
To evaluate the role of the Theta roles associated with the verb, we conducted an 
Act-out task as Experiment I. In one of the trials, children were presented with the 
same lay-out as in Experiment I in Section 4.2 (here reported as Figure 8) and 
asked to perform the action in (35) rather than (34):   
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              Figure 8: On/off Context 
 
(34) Put the frog on the napkin. 
 
(35) Move the frog on the napkin. 
 
Since the verb move does not necessarily assign a Destination theta role, our 
hypothesis was that children would be equally likely to interpret the PP on the 
napkin as a destination and as a modifier of the preceding NP the frog.33 The 
Theta roles are discharged on either analysis, so the sentence Move the frog on the 
napkin can be construed as a complete sentence on either analysis. Depending on 
which parse is entertained, however, a different instruction would result. So, for 
                                                 
33 We are aware that move could also be associated with a destination interpretation in a similar 
way to the verb put. We could have thus chosen other kind of verbs for which a destination 
interpretation was not possible, as the verb touch for example. However, our purpose was to 
compare two verbs which could both occur with a PP (interpreted as destination of the action); but 
two verbs which also differ in that one verb (i.e. put) requires the Destination Theta role while the 
other (i.e. move) does not. We think any other comparison would have been irrelevant.  
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example, if the Destination interpretation is chosen, children will interpret the 
string in (35) as paraphrased in (36). On the contrary, if the PP on the napkin is 
interpreted as a modifier of the NP the frog, children will interpret the string as 
paraphrased in (37). 
 
(36) Move the frog towards the napkin. 
 
(37) Move the frog that is on the napkin 
 
Fifteen children (age from 3;9 to 6;1- mean age: 4;9) participated in this 
experiment. The experimental hypothesis was that children would resort to the 
pragmatic inference less frequently than in Experiment I. This expectation was 
upheld; children moved the frog that was not already on the empty napkin only 
55% of the time vs. 92% of the time of Experiment I. In the remainder of the 
trials, children choose the frog that was already on a napkin and moved that pair 
frog-napkin to various locations in the experimental work space: sometimes 
towards the other napkin, sometimes towards the other frog. Another common 
action was to move the frog from the napkin it was on, off the napkin and place it 
close to the other frog, which was already off a napkin. Interestingly, children 
were not puzzled about which frog to select as they were in the adjective 
condition experiment. They either selected the frog off the napkin, and they 
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performed the pragmatic inference in analogy with the put-sentences (thus putting 
this frog on the empty napkin)34, or they selected the frog already on a napkin. In 
this case they looked puzzled as to where to move the frog they had selected. 
Children often moved that frog close to the other frog and then looked at the 
experimenter asking here? The findings suggest that some children interpreted the 
sentence in (35) as paraphrased in (36), while others interpreted (35) as 
paraphrased in (37), as expected on the view that the lexical properties of the verb 
play a role when both interpretations equally conform to the Principle of 
Referential Success. 
The results also suggest that children’s attempt to carry out a pragmatic 
inference is affected by the parse that they have assigned to the target sentence. 
Thus, it would not be surprising if children’s behavior in the setting of Trueswell 
et al. (1999) also turned to change depending on the verb that is used. In fact, if 
children are presented with a verb for which VP-attachment preference is not 
operative, they will simply select NP-attachment. In turn, this means they will not 
need to resort to a pragmatic inference in order to identify the referent of the 
definite NP.  
 
 
 
                                                 
34 This is a legitimate action since, as we pointed out in ft.10, the verb move followed by a PP can 
have a destination interpretation.  
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3.7 Conclusions 
 
Let us summarize the findings of the present chapter. We started by drawing upon 
children’s ability to carry out pragmatic inferences, and we investigated which 
factors can affect this ability. Our findings show that children’s attempts to 
perform pragmatic inferences can be affected by syntactic constraints (i.e., lexical 
properties of the verb involved) as well as semantic constraints (i.e., properties of 
the command and the nature of the adjective used in the same sentence). The task 
of the next chapter is to design a new study investigating children’s adherence to 
the Principle of Referential Success which would take into consideration 
children’s ability to perform pragmatic inferences, as discussed in the present 
chapter. Thus we are back to square one. Where Trueswell et al. began. The ‘right’ 
study of the issue remains to be done, but now we are in a position to design an 
experiment that controls for a number of factors that we have identified as 
possibly leading to the wrong conclusions about children’s use of context in 
parsing. 
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Chapter IV 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter II described an experiment conducted by Trueswell et al. (1999) to assess 
children’s ability to resolve the temporal syntactic ambiguity occurring when the 
verb put is followed by two Prepositional Phrases as in Put the frog on the napkin 
into the box. The findings led Trueswell et al. (1999) to conclude that (a) children 
are less able than adults to use the referential context to guide their on-line parsing 
decisions, at least under certain processing conditions, and (b) children are unable 
to retrace their footsteps, once led down a garden path. Ina arguing against the 
first conclusion, we pointed out that the 2-Referent Context does not effectively 
support (or at least not immediately) NP-attachment of the first PP. The point was 
that the definite NP the frog could be easily assigned a referent under a VP-
attachment scenario, by means of a pragmatic inference, for which there is both 
provided theoretical justification and experimental evidence. It remains to be 
explained why (some) children behave differently from adults, continuing to 
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maintain the VP-attachment even after hearing the second PP into the box, which 
should have signaled to children that they had been led won a garden-path. 
Children’s non-adult behavior is attested in the 2-Referent Context as well as in 
the 1-Referent context.  
Assuming that children have reasons to attach the PP on the napkin to the 
VP, the question is why they are unable to revise their initial interpretation, what 
prevents children from revising their initial parse? It seems that children differ 
form adults in this ability. The problem under discussion is particularly relevant 
for the 2-Referent Context, where a different attachment possibility is made 
salient by the context (i.e., NP-attachment). To address this issue we will draw 
upon previous research investigating linguistic constructions different from 
sentences containing two prepositional phrases. A common feature to the various 
constructions we consider is that research with young children has highlighted 
children’s eagerness to carry out verbal instructions. 
 
 
4.2 Extra-linguistic components of children’s behavior 
 
When someone is asked to act out the meaning of an utterance (i.e., executing a 
command), her task includes the assignment of an interpretation to the sentence, 
relying on principles provided by the syntax and the semantics. In addition to this, 
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however, the subject must also generate a plan for carrying out the appropriate 
actions corresponding to the linguistic input, using the objects available in the 
experimental workspace. Plans are created and used in concert with other aspects 
of language processing. These additional elements of processing involve the 
outputs of semantic components (which in turn depend on the output of syntactic 
components), as well as components of the language apparatus that are 
responsible for accessing linguistic principles and coordinating their use, e.g., 
verbal working memory. The process of devising a plan and executing it may be 
separated in time, or they may be interleaved in time. In other words, one could 
delay the execution of the plan until after the entire plan has been devised. 
Alternatively, , one may start acting on the entities available in the experimental 
workspace as soon possible. Drawing upon the terminology of computer 
languages, Hamburger and Crain (1982; 1984; 1987) refer to these possibilities as 
‘compile mode’ and ‘interpret mode’ behavior respectively.  
The two possible strategies for plan execution for execution of a plan are 
invoked by Hamburger and Crain to explain the results of different act-out tasks. 
They suggest that children tend to adopt the interpret mode to a larger extent than 
adults do. If they are correct, then children give in to pressure to execute 
subcomponents of the plan they are formulating as soon as possible. On this view 
children’s less are less ‘automated’ or ‘compiled’ than thos of adults, possibly as a 
consequence of children’s limited capacity in verbal working memory. Because of 
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this, children are forced to interleave planning and execution, they tend to act out 
parts of the plans they are formulating, before all components of planning have 
been completed.  
In several studies, it has been found that children’s errors in performance 
arise because children begin to execute plans before all of the requisite planning 
has been completed, i.e., they engage in interpret mode behavior. Because of 
pressure to interpret language on-the-fly, children tend to (sometimes mistakenly) 
act out verbal instructions sequentially, i.e., in the order in which the components 
of planning can be formulated, based on the linguistic input. As a consequence, 
children sometimes act out the meanings of sentences in an order-of-mention 
fashion (Amidon and Peter, 1972; Crain, 1982). There are several examples of 
children’s premature execution of linguistic instructions in the literature on child 
language. 
Sentences with a restrictive relative clause, such as (1), illustrate the 
phenomenon of interpret mode behavior of children. In an Act-Out (‘do-what-I-
say’) task with four- to six-year-olds, the child subjects were instructed to act out 
the sentence in (1) in a workspace that contained one dog, one cow, and one sheep 
(e.g., Sheldon 1974; Tavakolian 1981).  
 
(1) The dog pushed the cow that jumped over the fence.  
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Children often responded by making the dog push the cow first, and then making 
the dog jump over the sheep. This response is not appropriate for sentence (1), but 
it is appropriate for sentences like (2), with conjoined clauses.  
 
(2) The dog pushed the cow and jumped over the fence.  
 
This observation led some researchers to conclude that children assign a 
‘conjoined clause analysis’ to sentences with relative clauses (Tavakolian, 1981). 
The introduction of additional cows into the experimental setup sharply 
reduced children’s errors in a subsequent study, however. Presumably the 
additional objects permitted the relative clause to serve its proper pragmatic 
function – that of restricting from a set to a subset (of the appropriate size) of the 
original set. Satisfying the felicity conditions associated with linguistic 
expressions seemed to enhance children’s ability to compile the entire plan before 
starting its execution, according to Hamburger and Crain (1982; 1984; 1987).  
From the planning viewpoint, another relevant finding appeared in the 
Hamburger and Crain study. That study was designed to satisfy the restrictive 
function of the relative clause. Although children acted out sentences like (1) 
correctly selecting one member of the set of cows as the referent of the expression 
the cow that jumped over the fence, the specific sequences of actions that children 
performed differed as a function of age. In response to (1), four-year-old children 
 
 104
(and audits) made the cow jump over the fence first, and then made the dog push 
the cow. That is, four- year-olds acted out the content of the relative clause before 
they acted out the content of the main clause. Conceptually, this makes sense, 
because it is the cow that jumped over the fence that the dog pushed. By contrast, 
three-year-old children acted out the two clauses in an order-of-mention fashion, 
main clause first. According to Hamburger and Crain, the order-of-mention result 
is a hallmark of the interpret mode at work in child language. Children act out 
subcomponents of the plan as soon as they devise those subcomponents. These, in 
turn, correspond to fragments of the linguistic instruction that they hear. 
There are other examples of the interpret mode leading to mistakes by 
young children. One example was uncovered when children asked to respond to 
sentences containing the temporal terms before and after. Consider the examples 
in (3) and (4).  
 
(3) Pick up the helicopter after you pick up the car.  
 
(4) After you pick up the car pick up the helicopter.  
 
Several studies found that children picked up the objects in the wrong order in 
response to the requests like (3), whereas they responded ‘correctly’ to ones like 
(4) (Amidon and Carey, 1972; Clark, 1971). This is another order-of-mention 
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result. And again, changes in experimental design were found to reduce children’s 
errors in a subsequent study (Crain, 1982). The study by Crain (1982) modified 
the experimental situation, so that a child had already expressed her intent to 
perform the action mentioned in the subordinate clause (i.e., to pick up the 
helicopter) before the test sentence was presented. As a result, requests like the 
one in (3) were almost never misinterpreted, despite the conflict they exhibit 
between order-of-mention and the correct conceptual order.  
From a planning perspective, both children’s errors and the disappearance 
of those errors in certain experimental paradigms can be readily explained. The 
errors are an order-of-mention phenomenon, resulting from the interpret mode 
behavior. However, when the child expresses the intent to pick up the helicopter 
in response to the instruction in (3), the child is mentally computing a plan to 
perform the action mentioned in the subordinate clause. Formulating the plan for 
that part of the action in advance makes it easier for the child to compile the plan 
for the entire sentence.  
The final example of plan assembly and execution by children involves 
phrases with prenominal modifiers like second striped ball. In a study of 
children’s command of phrase structure, Matthei (1982) reported systematic non-
adult behavior by children when they were asked to perform the instruction in (5), 
using an array of objects similar to the one depicted in Figure 1: 
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(5) Point to the second striped ball. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
 
When adults were given the same instruction (counting from the left), they 
consistently pointed to the second of the striped balls, i.e., the third object (from 
the left) in the array. By contrast, 4- to 6-year-old children often pointed to the 
second ball in the array, which happens to be striped. Hamburger and Crain 
(1984) raised the possibility that “the child subject… might start to plan and even 
act while the sentence is being uttered, possibly making a premature and incorrect 
decision.” Consistent with this hypothesis, children’s ‘errors’ vanished when the 
experimenter produced the test sentence before the child had a chance to execute 
any action. One way this result was achieved was for the experimenter to hide the 
experimental display from the child until the sentence has been uttered. This 
feature of experimental design was called phrase-and-then-display by Hamburger 
and Crain. In such circumstances, the child could (mentally) devise a plan in 
compile-mode, as adults do. If so, children should be expected to perform 
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conceptually correct sequences of actions, just as adults do. As a matter of record, 
children correctly pointed to the right ball (i.e., the third ball in the array) when 
the phrase-and-then-display methodology was employed in the study by 
Hamburger and Crain.  
To sum up, this section reviewed previous studies investigating children’s 
interpretation of different linguistic constructions. All of those studies involved an 
Act-Out task, a task which requires the child to interpret instructions and to carry 
out the relevant actions. Focusing on the particular responses that children gave in 
previous studies (i.e., an order-of-mention response), Hamburger and Crain 
(1984) concluded that children’s behavior should not be taken as evidence of a 
failure to access the adult interpretation of the relevant construction. Rather, they 
argued that children’s behavior was dictated by their eagerness to execute 
subcomponents of the plan as soon as these were devised. Given the possibility 
that children’s behavior in act-out tasks is affected by children’s failure/reluctance 
to delay the execution of the plan until the entire plan is devised, it is worth 
considering whether the act-out task employed by Trueswell et al (1999) was 
open to the same problems.  
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4.3  Interpretation and Planning in the Trueswell et al. (1999) study 
 
Returning to the Trueswell et al. findings, it is readily apparent that once children 
begin to plan or even to execute a response, in both the 1-Referent and the 2-
Referent Contexts, they are unable to revise the cognitive algorithms (i.e., the 
response plans for acting out the meanings of linguistic expressions), which they 
have begun to execute. Based on previous research, we assume that children only 
gradually develop the performance routines needed to delay the immediate 
execution of plans. Here is what we are suggesting. Children’s inability to revise 
their initial interpretation in the 2-Referent Context (where an alternative is 
contextually available) may be the result of the interpret-mode behavior.35 In 
particular, children may have formulated a plan and even started to execute it 
before the entire instruction Put the frog on the napkin into the box had been 
uttered by the experimenter. Specifically, children may have planned a specific 
course of action that interpreted the first PP on the napkin as referring to the 
destination. Having committed to putting the frog (that was not on a napkin) on 
the empty napkin (via the pragmatic inference described in the last chapter), it 
proved untenable for children to revise their formulation of the plan, because the 
                                                 
35 Remember that in the 1-Referent Context, a garden path effect at the occurrence of the second 
PP was expected. This was indeed the case for both children and adults: however, it manifested 
itself differently. While children moved the (only) frog onto the empty napkin, adults only looked 
at the empty napkin. In other words, adults initially considered the destination interpretation of the 
first PP but were able to revise this interpretation, while children were not.  
 
 109
action they were committed (and possibly even started) to perform could not be 
integrated into any appropriately revised plan.36  
If this line of reasoning is correct, then children differ from adults, in part, 
because children assemble plans and begin to execute them in the interpret-mode, 
rather than in the compile-mode, as adults do. We have seen, however, that it is 
possible to render the interpret-mode inoperative, in the discussion of children’s 
interpretation of phrases like second striped ball. We saw that, the experimental 
maneuver of phrase-and-then-display sufficed to elicit compile-mode behavior 
from children. It is expected that children will perform like adults, then, if the 
phrase-and-then-display methodology is implemented in studies of PP 
attachment. An experiment is presented in this chapter demonstrating that 
children do not commit errors in responding to instructions like Put the frog on 
the napkin into the box in the phrase-and-then-display condition, presumably 
because this experimental manipulation prevents children from prematurely 
executing pieces of the plans they generate.  
 
 
 
                                                 
36 A better look at children’s mistakes shows that an attempt to solve this impasse was indeed done 
by some children. In fact, as seen earlier, one common mistake involved moving the wrong frog 
(the one off the napkin) on the empty napkin and then into the box. Another common mistake 
involved moving the wrong frog (the one off the napkin) on the empty napkin and then the right 
frog (the one on the napkin) into the box. Both these mistakes can be viewed as an attempt from 
the children to revise their action based on the new information coming from the linguistic input.  
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4.4  Blocking the interpret mode and the pragmatic inference 
 
Our hypothesis is that children’s non-adult behavior in sentences like Put the frog 
on the napkin into the box is the result of the co-action of two factors, which we 
extensively discussed. First, the 2-Referent Context – one frog on a napkin, one 
frog off a napkin-- is such that children can perform a pragmatic inference, which 
allows them to assign a referent to the definite NP the frog as soon as it occurs. 
Second, as we have just seen, children could start assembling a plan (and 
executing it) before the whole sentence is uttered. 
 Thus, an important step towards designing the right experiment to test 
children’s ability to resolve syntactic ambiguities of sentences containing two PPs 
is to find a way to inhibit children’s eagerness to formulate (and execute) a plan 
and to inhibit the possibility of performing a pragmatic inference to identify the 
uniquely salient referent of the definite NP the frog. In the preceding section, we 
considered an experimental maneuvers that could lead to improved behavior by 
children, by erasing the effects of one impediment to children’s successful 
performance. In particular, we have discussed how to render the interpret-mode 
inoperative. For example, based on previous empirical evidence we hypothesized 
that the experimental maneuver of phrase-and-then-display should suffice to elicit 
the compile-mode from children in response to sentences like Put the frog on the 
napkin into the box. Similarly, we have discussed how we might go about 
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inhibiting children’s pragmatic inference by using color adjectives. This brings us, 
at last, to an experiment we designed to investigate children’s resolution of 
temporary ambiguities, which is not vitiated by the problems of the original study 
by Trueswell et al. (1999).  
 
4.4.1 Experiment IV 
 
In order to address the confounding factors that affect the Trueswell et al. study, 
we conducted an experiment similar to the 2-Referent Context condition 
employed by Trueswell et al. (1999). We introduced two changes in the design, 
however. One change was to use color terms in the instruction: this was done to 
inhibit the pragmatic inference that we discussed in the last chapter. The second 
change was to implement the phrase-and-then-display condition, to impede 
children’s premature formation (and execution) of a response. The experimental 
hypothesis was that these experimental procedures would result in ‘correct’ adult 
interpretations and actions.  
To inhibit the pragmatic inference, both the relevant objects were 
positioned on a platform of the same kind, but of a different color, so that only a 
color adjective could be used to distinguish between them. For example, one trial 
was about two frogs, both of which were on a napkin (one red, one blue), and 
there was an empty, red napkin (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2: the two-color-referent context  
 
Second, to implement the phrase-and-then-display maneuver, children 
were introduced with the lay-out depicted in Figure 2 in the most neutral way. In 
so doing, we avoided leads-in that could have biased children toward one 
interpretation over the other, thus affecting our results. For example we never 
mentioned that one object was on a platform while the other was misplaced. We 
also avoided the use of the preposition on in describing the context, in order to 
block earlier inferences. Children were simply told that a puppet, Kermit the Frog, 
manipulated by one of the experimenters, had a special project it wanted to study. 
Then, while the puppet was entertaining the child, the other experimenter placed 
the objects on the workspace in front if the child. After being introduced with the 
scene, children were asked to turn away while they were listening to the 
instructions, which contained a temporary ambiguity, as in (6).  
Blue
Red Red
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(6) Put the frog on the red napkin into the box. 37  
 
Only after hearing the entire sentence, children were allowed to look at the 
scene again and perform the action they were asked to.  
We interviewed 22 children in the same age range of those tested in the 
Trueswell et al. study. More precisely, the children who participated in the present 
experiment ranged in age from 3;09 to 5;09, with a mean age of 4;0838 Each child 
was presented with 4 target trials, four fillers and one warm-up. All and only the 
target trials were instructions containing the verb put as illustrated in (6)39. 
 As predicted, the child subjects performed the correct action 89% of the 
time. (i.e., on 78 of 88 trials). The findings suggest that children’s failure to use 
referential information in previous research was due to their tendency to 
formulate response plans on the fly, which in turn exploited their ability to make a 
pragmatic inference in order to individuate the referent of the definite NP.  
Before firm conclusions can be drawn about the results of the present 
                                                 
37 Despite the occurrence of a color adjective in the instruction, a temporary ambiguity emerges in 
(6) after the first PP as in the Trueswell at al. study. 
38 The children who participated in Experiment III did not participate to Experiment I or II. 
39 The choice of not having simple sentences containing the verb put as filler trials, as in Put the 
frog in the box, now put it back was motivated by the fact that in kind of sentences the PP 
immediately following the NP must be interpreted as a destination. As a consequence, children 
might be biased towards a destination interpretation.  This is also what we think happened in the 
Trueswell et al. experiment.  
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experiment, however, we need to rule out the possibility that the experimental 
maneuvers we introduced in the present experiment, using a modified version of 
2-Referent Context, would improve children’s responses even in the 1-Referent 
Context. That is, the changes that were introduced (phrase-and-then-display and 
the use of prenominal adjectives) might have increased children’s willingness to 
interpret the initial PP as a modifier, regardless of the specific context. If so, then 
the present study would only show that children are capable of interpreting PPs as 
modifiers. To control for this possibility, we conducted two experiments: the first 
experiment, Experiment V, was designed to control the effect of prosody. This 
experiment includes the use of prenominal color adjective in the target sentence in 
the classical 2-Referent Context where one of the frogs is on a napkin while the 
other is not. The second control, Experiment VI, incorporates the phrase-and-
then-display methodology and the use of prenominal adjective in the 1-Referent 
Context.  
 
4.4.2. Experiment V 
 
The present experiment was designed to investigate whether (the presence of) an 
adjective and the corresponding change in prosody might have been responsible 
for children’s improved performance in Experiment IV. Research on adult 
sentence processing has shown that adults can make use of prosodic information 
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in determining the syntactic structure of an utterance (see Watson and Gibson, 
2004). Although the role of prosodic information in the case at hand seems to be 
very limited (see Snedeker and Trueswell, 2003), we decided to conduct an 
experiment employing one of the contexts in which children have been showed to 
experience problems. Such context is the classical 2-Referent Context in Figure 3 
below. Children were then asked to act out the instruction in (7), relative to the 
context in Figure 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Figure 3 – two-referent context 
 
(7) Put the frog on the red napkin into the box. 
 
The context depicted in Figure 3 is the same context which elicited children’s 
RED RED 
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incorrect responses 39% of the times in the Trueswell et al. study. The only 
difference implemented in the present experiment is in the target sentence which 
contains a prenominal adjective. Notice that the use of the color adjective in (7) is 
somehow redundant since it does not add any relevant information. The two frogs 
in the context could be distinguished in virtue of their being on or off a napkin 
regardless of the color of such napkin. However, this does not constitute a 
problem since, as illustrated in the previous chapter, adjectives could be used 
naturally in a redundant or appositive way (see Sedivy, 2002; 2004). Moreover, 
since the empty napkin is also red, children could still being led down the garden-
path, thus interpreting the PP on the red napkin as a destination. Let us recall that 
when presented with the context in Figure 3 and asked to Put the frog on the 
napkin into the box in previous studies children perform the right action (moving 
the frog that is on the napkin into the box) less than 50% of the time.40 By 
analogy, we would expect the same percentage of correct actions in the present 
experiment too. This is assuming, as we do, that the presence of the prenominal 
color adjective in the instruction does not increase children’s ability to access a 
modifier interpretation of the first PP per se. If, on the contrary, the presence of 
the prenominal adjective in the instruction does affect children’s interpretation of 
that PP, then one would expect a significant increase in the number of children’s 
right actions. 
                                                 
40 To be precise, 39% of the time in the Trueswell et al. study.  
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We interviewed 15 children (age from 3;05 to 5;03; mean age 4;05).41 
Each child was presented with 4 target trials, four fillers and one warm-up. All 
and only the target trials were instructions containing the verb put followed by the 
preposition on, as illustrated in (7) above. As for the results, children performed 
the right action only 32% of the time, consistently choosing the frog off a napkin 
the rest of the time. These results show that the change in prosody, i.e., having a 
prenominal adjective in the PP, does not affect children interpretation of that PP.  
 
4.4.3 Experiment VI 
 
The second factor we decided to control for has to do with the possibility that the 
two changes introduced in our experiment IV (phrase-and-then-display, color 
adjective) would improve children’s performance even in situation in which a 
processing difficulty is expected.42 If this were the case, the better performance of 
children we obtained would just show that children are capable of modifier 
interpretations when the necessary help is provided, (again) independently from 
the specific context used. However, our purpose here is also to show that the 
context matters and that children pay attention to referential cues in interpreting 
temporarily ambiguous sentences. To rule out the possibility that the two 
                                                 
41 The children who participated in Experiment V did not participate to Experiment I ,II, III or IV. 
42 In addition the experiment will also provide evidence regarding the role of prosody, just as 
Experiment V. 
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maneuvers we employed simply increased children’s ability to access modifier 
interpretations, we conducted an experiment using the same two maneuvers in the 
1-Referent Context. The 1-Referent Context, in fact, is context in which a garden 
path effect is expected. In fact, as we introduced in chapter II the presence of a 
single frog in the context, should lead children (but also adults,) to garden path 
when asked to act out an instruction containing the verb put followed by two PPs. 
For this reason, we chose to employ this context to evaluate the effect of the 
changes introduced in Experiment IV, which significantly improved children’s 
correct actions (from 39% to 89%).  
To illustrate, one trial was about one frog and one chick, both of which 
were on a napkin (one red, one blue), and there was an empty, red napkin (see 
Figure 4)43. After children were introduced to the lay-out, they were asked to turn 
away. While they could not see the display, they were given a verbal instruction, 
which contained a temporary ambiguity, as in (8). Having heard the entire 
sentence, children were allowed to turn back to the scene again and to comply 
with the instruction.44 It is important to notice that the use of a color adjective in 
the sentence (the PP on the red napkin) does not add any relevant information in 
the present scenario since there is only one frog in the context.  
 
                                                 
43 Notice that the fact that the other animal (i.e., the chick) is also on a napkin does not constitute a 
problem since the referent for the NP the frog could be identified immediately given the presence 
of a single frog in the context. 
44 As the reader could see, the procedures were exactly the same as the ones for experiment IV.  
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Figure 4: the one-color-referent context 
 
(8) Put the frog on the red napkin into the box. 
 
As we have seen (Trueswell et al., 1999), children were found to experience 
garden path effects in responding to instructions like Put the frog on the napkin 
into the box in the 1-Referent Context in previous studies. In particular, children 
moved the only frog from the napkin it was on onto the other napkin (60% of the 
times) and then (eventually) into the box.45 If the changes introduced in 
Experiment IV increased children’s general ability to interpret PPs as modifiers, 
we would expect a significant improvement in children’s behavior, i.e., more 
correct actions, in the one-color-referent context exemplified in Figure 4. To the 
                                                 
45 Although adults almost never produced an incorrect series of action, show nevertheless signs of 
being led down the garden path in their looking paradigm. Adults consistently looked at the empty 
napkin immediately after hearing the PP ‘on the napkin’, thus showing that a destination 
interpretation for that PP was entertained. 
Blu
Red Red
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contrary, if the changes introduced in Experiment IV improved children’s 
performance to interpret PP as modifier relatively to that particular context—the 
2-Referent Context--we would expect children to be led down the garden path in 
the present experiment to (more or less) the same extent, as they had been in 
previous research. 
We interviewed 12 children (age from 3;05 to 5;04; mean age 4;10).46 
Each child was presented with 4 target trials, four fillers and one warm-up. All 
and only the target trials were instructions containing the verb put followed by the 
preposition on, as illustrated in (8) above. As predicted, children manifested the 
signs of having been led down a garden path; namely, they moved the frog onto 
the empty napkin and then into the box, on 45% of the trials (22/48)47. Children 
keep accessing the VP interpretation of the first PP on the napkin.  
The findings of Experiment V thus suggest that the mere presence of an 
adjective and the phrase-and-then-display mode introduced in Experiment IV do 
not facilitate children’s interpretation of the initial prepositional phrase as a 
modifier. If that was true, children would have performed as successfully in the 1-
Referent Context as in the 2-Referent Context. However one clarification is in 
place.  
We hypothesized based on previous evidence that children’s incorrect 
actions might be due to their eagerness to perform plans on the fly, even before 
                                                 
46 The children who participated in Experiment V did not participate to Experiment I , II, III or IV. 
47 Trueswell et al. 1999 reported roughly 60% incorrect actions. 
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the entire sentence has been uttered. That is, when given an instruction, children 
tend to assemble (and sometimes to execute) a response plan as the instruction 
unfolds over time. We have also seen how the phrase-and-display maneuver 
prevents children from forming early response plans with many linguistics 
constructions as well as with sentences like Put the frog on the napkin into the 
box. In fact, withdrawing the experimental setting from children while the 
sentence is being uttered makes it more difficult to plan a response in advance as 
well as start executing it. Given this explanation, one might wonder why children 
kept performing the wrong series of actions in the 1-Referent Context when the 
phrase-and-then-display maneuver is employed. In this situation in fact children 
are obliged to listen to the entire sentence before they are allowed to watch the 
experimental setting again and act-out the instruction. The question is even more 
interesting if we consider that in the 1-Referent Context adults too are led down 
the garden path: adults look at the empty napkin immediately after the occurrence 
of the PP on the napkin, and this was interpreted by Trueswell et al (1999) as a 
sign that they were considering the VP-attachment interpretation. However, the 
garden path is resolved by the time the second PP into the box occurs. Again, it is 
apparent that for children the occurrence of the second PP is not crucial as for 
adults: children entertain the VP-attachment interpretation even when the early 
execution of a response is inhibited by the phrase-and-then-display maneuver, 
which ‘force’ them to hear the entire sentence before being able to act-out it out. 
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We think the argument is well taken and raises an interesting concern. In fact, it 
assumes that in the phrase-and-then-display mode, children interpret the target 
sentence off-line rather then on-line. This hypothesis, however, ignores the fact 
that children are allowed to look at the scene before they are asked to turn away or 
close their eyes. In fact the scene is initially introduced to children to make sure 
they know the names of the objects being used. This means that children tested in 
the 1-Referent Context know that there is only one frog and, as a consequence, 
when hearing the instruction Put the frog … they also start to interpret the 
sentence having that frog in mind. Under these circumstances, children obey to 
the Theta Assignment Principle thus entertaining the VP-attachment once the PP 
on the napkin is uttered. No other option is made available by the context. This 
results in a garden-path: an interpretation that needs to be revised. Children are 
not able to reanalyze whatever interpretation they pick at first. As we said this is 
one conclusion offered by Trueswell et al. (1999) that we feel confident in 
accepting. Thus, children are stuck with an interpretation that they cannot revise 
and perform the wrong series of actions. By contrast, let us recall what happened 
in the 2-Referent Context where the two frogs are both on a napkin but of a 
different color. Again, in the phrase-and-then-display mode, children are allowed 
to watch the scene before turning away from it. Here, however, both frogs could 
serve as the referent for the NP the frog when children are presented with the 
target instruction. Things are even worsen because both the frogs are on a napkin 
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already so a straightforward pragmatic inference of the type illustrated in the 
previous chapter will not help children either.48 As a consequence, children relied 
on the linguistic material to help them in identifying the intended frog, they 
accessed the NP-interpretation of the PP on the (red) napkin and performed the 
correct action. Thus children do not attach the PP on the (red) napkin to the verb 
phrase. Rather they use the linguistic information in order to select NP-
attachment. On this view, the maneuvers that lead to children’s adult behavior in 
Experiment V do not improve children’s ability to revise an incorrect 
interpretation. If this was the case, one would also observe improved behavior in 
the 1-Referent Context, contrary to fact. Rather, the maneuvers that lead to 
children’s adult behavior in Experiment V inhibit the initial VP attachment PP on 
the (red) napkin to the verb phrase, so that NP-attachment is a live option, an 
option that is ultimately preferred in compliance with the Principle of Referential 
success. Thus, a garden path arises in the 1-refernt context and children cannot 
recover from the initial interpretation. By contrast, in the 2-Referent Context 
children select the correct interpretation form the very beginning and do not need 
to recover from a wrong initial hypothesis. 
This said, we can reach the following conclusion about Experiment IV: 
when the relevant pragmatic inference was blocked, and when premature 
                                                 
48 It is true that the two frogs are on napkins of different color so a pragmatic inference could is 
possible in principle. One possibility is that children would resort to that kind of inference if they 
were ‘forced,’ for example by incoming linguistic material, to interpret the initial PP. 
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execution of children’s response plans was blocked, children demonstrated 
adherence to referentially based parsing principles. We interpret the findings as 
indicating children’s generation of a structural analysis that conforms to the 
presupposition of uniqueness associated with the definite determiner, so long as 
they are prevented from immediately executing the response dictated by the VP-
attachment preference.  
 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 
Based on the findings of the experiment presented in the previous section, we feel 
confident in maintaining our default hypothesis. First, children and adults share 
all of the core properties of the performance system in which linguistic knowledge 
is embedded, as well as sharing knowledge of the linguistic principles themselves. 
We conclude, in particular, that children and adults both adhere to fundamental 
parsing principles that have been proposed in the literature: the Theta Assignment 
Principle and the Principle of Referential Success. The difference between 
children and adults is that the processing of linguistic input is less automatic for 
children than it is for adults. 
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Chapter V 
 
 
5.1  Introduction  
 
Much contemporary research on child language focuses on children’s semantic 
competence, especially children’s understanding of quantifiers (see Philip, 1995; 
Musolino, 1998). Recent studies demonstrate children’s extensive knowledge of 
the semantic properties of quantification, despite claims to the contrary in 
previous research (e.g., Inhelder and Piaget, 1964; cf. Crain, Thornton, Boster, 
Conway, Lillo-Martin and Woodams, 1996; Gualmini, 2003). Research on 
children’s use of determiners has followed a more conservative path. In particular, 
no agreement has been reached about children’s over-generation of the definite 
determiner the, first documented by Maratsos (1976) and Karmiloff-Smith (1979). 
Children’s non-adult behavior has been attributed to a deficit in pragmatic 
competence (e.g., Maratsos, 1976; Matthewson and Schaeffer, 2000) or to a 
difference in children’s lexical entry for the determiner the (Wexler, 2003). 
Nevertheless, several linguistic properties that distinguish between the definite 
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and indefinite articles have not been investigated. In the previous chapters we will 
focus on the role of the context in selection of the appropriate referent of definite 
NPs. In this chapter, we will focus on a different property that distinguishes 
between the definite article the and the indefinite a. This property is the ambiguity 
of sentences containing the verb to have. The ambiguity is between a possession 
reading and a custodial reading (e.g., Iatridou, 1995, Belvin and den Dikken, 
1997). Interestingly, this ambiguity arises only if the verb to have is followed by 
an indefinite article (e.g., I have a car). If a definite article follows the verb to 
have, however, only the custodial reading is available (e.g., I have the car). The 
chapter is organized as follows. First we will introduce the semantic properties of 
the definite determiner ‘the’ and we will highlight the differences with the 
indefinite determiner ‘a’. In particular we will focus on the presupposition of 
uniqueness associated with the definite determiner. The discussion is also relevant 
for the previous chapters. Then, we will report the results of some experiments on 
children’s use of the definite determiner which show children’s overgeneration of 
the definite ‘determiner’—namely the fact that children use the definite 
determiner in situations in which an indefinite determiner would be more 
appropriate. In so doing, we will also present some of the theories proposed in the 
literature to account for children’s mistakes. At the end of the chapter we will 
illustrate the behavior of the definite and indefinite determiner in have-
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constructions and we report a study designed to investigate whether children are 
sensitive to this subtle difference in constructions that contain the verb to have.  
 
 
5.2  What is definiteness? 
 
In many languages, a noun phrase may contain an element whose principal role is 
to indicate the definiteness or the indefiniteness of the noun itself. In English this 
element is a lexical item: definites take the, while indefinites take a in the 
singular. In the next section I will provide a brief overview of the semantics of 
definiteness, based on the discussion in Heim (1991).   
 
5.2.1  Definite NPs 
 
A classical analysis for definites dates back to Russell (1905). According to this 
analysis a sentence of the form The φ is ψ must be analyzed as follows: 
 
(1) a. There exists at least one x such that x is φ  
 b. At most one x is φ  
 c. Such x which is φ is ψ 
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Under this analysis, a sentence containing a definite NP is analyzed as an 
existential sentence which asserts the existence of a unique entity described by the 
noun which satisfies the property expressed by the predicate. In order for the 
sentence to be true, all the three conditions given in (1) must be met. A sentence 
like (2), for example, will be true only if there exists exactly one frog and that 
frog is sleeping.  
 
(2) The frog is sleeping. 
 
According to the Russellian analysis, if the unique frog is not sleeping (thus 
violating (1)c) the sentence is false. If no frog exists (contra (1)b) or multiple 
frogs (contra (1)a) exist the sentence is also false.  
This analysis, however, incurs into problems when the entity denoted by 
the definite NP does not exist, as in (3). 
 
(3) The King of France is bald. 
 
Under the Russellian analysis (3) should be false since the king of France does not 
exist. However, speakers often judge such sentence as neither false nor true. 
Given the non-existence of the entity denoted by the definite NP, it is 
counterintuitive to evaluate whether the property predicated by the predicate holds 
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for such non-existing entity or not. The condition of existence as well as the 
condition of uniqueness are better viewed as prerequisites for assigning a truth 
value to a sentence containing a definite NP rather then part of the meaning of the 
sentence. Thus, if either (1)b or (1)c is violated the sentence cannot be assigned a 
truth value. This is roughly the solution proposed by Frege (1892) and the one 
assumed by the so-called Fregean analysis of definites. The standard Fregean 
analysis of the definite determiner assumes that the use of the definite determiner 
presupposes both the existence and the uniqueness of the entity described by the 
common noun with which the definite determiner is combined.  
Let us clarify the notion of presupposition before illustrating the 
presuppositional (Fregean) account of definite determiners. Roughly, the idea is 
that a proposition p presupposes another proposition q, if the truth of q is taken for 
granted, treated as uncontroversial, in order for p to be uttered felicitously. In 
other words, the truth of the statement expressed by a presupposition is a 
necessary condition in order to assign a truth-value to any statement associated 
with that presupposition. Here is how Heim (1991) puts it: 
 
(4) Let p and q be (possible partial) propositions. Then q is a semantic 
presupposition of p iff q is true at every world-time pair where p is true or 
false.         (Heim 1991:8) 
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Presuppositions place constraints on the assignment of semantic values. To 
illustrate let us consider the sentence in (5): 
 
(5) Joan stopped smoking. 
 
(6) Joan used to smoke. 
 
In a given context, the sentence in (5) could be true or false; regardless of its truth 
value, however, (5) presupposes the truth of (6). Now, if (5) is uttered in a 
situation in which it is known that (6) does not hold, the sentence in (5) could not 
be assigned a semantic value. The use of (5) in such circumstances will give rise 
to a presupposition failure and will be infelicitous.  
 This notion of presupposition has been extended to definites by the 
Fregean analysis of definites. The formal definition of the Fregean analysis in (7) 
is taken from Heim (1991).49 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 The index i refers to the situational context. 
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(7) [the φ ] ψ expresses that proposition which is: 
 a. true at an index i, if there is exactly one at φ i, and it is ψ at i 
 b. false at an index i, if there is exactly one φ at i, and it is not ψ at i 
 c. truth-valueless at an index i, if there isn’t exactly one φ at i. 
        (Heim 1991:9) 
 
Let us consider again the sentence in (2) here reported as (8): 
 
(8) The frog is sleeping. 
 
According to the definition in (7), this sentence is true if there exists a unique frog 
and it is sleeping; it is false if there exists a unique frog and it is not sleeping. 
However, (8) has no truth value if there exist no frog or there exist multiple frogs. 
 Before concluding this section on the semantic properties of the definite 
determiner a clarification is in place. We have seen how the felicitous use of a 
definite determiner presupposes the existence of a unique entity. Whereas the 
presupposition of existence always seems to be satisfied in contexts in which a 
definite is used felicitously, one can find many cases in which uniqueness does 
not hold and thus cannot be taken for granted. For instance, one can use sentences 
like (8) without that of only one frog exists in the whole world. This has been 
accounted for in the literature by assuming that the domain of discourse with 
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respect to which we interpret a definite NP depends on the utterance situation and 
constitutes only a small subset of all existing entities.50 In other cases, definite 
NPs are used in situations in which the uniquely identifying property has to be 
inferred. Consider (9), relative to the context depicted in Figure 1 (from Haddock, 
1989): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Figure 1: the rabbit in the hat 
 
(9) Now watch, I will remove the rabbit in the hat. 
                                                 
50 This objection is not peculiar to definite NP but it applies to any kind of quantified NP. The 
notion of contextual restriction is generally assumed for the interpretation of any quantified NP 
(see von Fintel, 1994). 
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Figure 1, contains two rabbits but the definite NP the rabbit successfully refers to 
the rabbit that is contained in the hat, presumably because to remove x from y, it 
must be the case that x is in y51. Another example is provided by Lyons (1999): 
 
(10) Context:[Ann, fixing her motorbike, is examining a large nut. Behind her, 
just out of reach, are three spanners, two of them obviously far too small 
for the nut] 
 Pass me the spanner, will you? 
 
Again, despite the presence of three spanners, the definite NP the spanner 
successfully refers to a unique salient spanner—the only one that can possibly fit 
the bill. These examples and many others (see Lyons, 1999) represent normal uses 
of the definite determiner. We can thus conclude that the presupposition of 
uniqueness is contextually restricted and only need to hold in the contextually 
relevant domain. Furthermore, as extensively illustrated in the previous chapters, 
the ultimate goal of the utterances (as well as the satisfaction of the relevant 
felicity conditions) might help in restricting the contextual domain such that a 
                                                 
51 The reader could see a clear connection with the experiments illustrated in the previous chapters 
with sentences like Put the frog on the napkin into the box. 
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uniquely salient entity, which serves as the referent of the definite NP, is singled 
out (see also Chambers, Tanenhaus, Eberhard, Filip and Carlson 2002 for further 
empirical evidence). 
 To recap, we assume with Heim (1991) that definite NPs presuppose the 
existence and the uniqueness of the entity denoted by the noun they are combined 
with. It remains to illustrate how indefinites NPs behave relatively to these 
semantic properties.   
 
5.2.2  Indefinites NPs 
 
The standard analysis for the indefinite determiner a, since Frege and Russell, 
treats that determiner in terms of the existential quantifier.52 Thus a sentence like 
(11) is true if there exists at least one frog that is sleeping and it will be false 
otherwise (i.e., if none of the frogs in the discourse domain are sleeping or if there 
are no frogs), as exemplified formally in (12): 
 
(11) A frog is sleeping. 
 
                                                 
52 We will not go into the issue of whether the lexical item introduces an existential quantifier or 
whether it simply introduces a variable which is then bound through existential closure (see Heim, 
1982).  
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(12) A sentence of the form [a φ ] ψ expresses that proposition which is true if 
there is at least one individual which is both φ and ψ, and false otherwise. 
                           (Heim 1991:26) 
 
It is relevant for our purposes to point out that the indefinite determiner a, as well 
as indefinites in general, do not presuppose uniqueness or existence. A sentence 
like (11), which contains an indefinite, is assigned a truth value even if more than 
one frog is sleeping or if no frog exists. However, the definition in (12) raises an 
interesting problem. Let us consider a sentence like (13) from (Heim, 1991): 
 
(13) I interviewed a father of the victim. 
 
Given the existential interpretation of indefinites in (12), the sentence in (13) 
should be felicitous. But it is not. The peculiarity of (13) derives from the fact that 
it is inescapably uttered in a context in which the uniqueness of the entity denoted 
by the NP can be taken for granted, since it is common knowledge that every 
person has exactly one father. It seems that the indefinite determiner a cannot be 
used in situations in which it is known that there exists a unique referent in the 
discourse. To account for this observation, Heim (1991) placed a further 
requirement on the interpretation of the indefinites determiners. This further 
requirement makes it infelicitous to use the indefinite determiner a if the 
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presuppositions associated with the definite determiner are satisfied. Here is how 
Heim (1991) puts it: 
 
(14) In utterance situations where the presupposition for [the φ ] ψ  is already 
 known to be satisfied, it is not permitted to utter [a φ ] ψ. 
        (Heim, 1991;p.27) 
 
This requirement comes from a pragmatic principle which has been called 
“Maximize Presuppositions”. 
 
  
(15) Maximize presupposition  
Make your contribution presuppose as much as possible.  
(Heim, 1991;p.28) 
 
Since, the definite determine the carries more presuppositions than the indefinite 
determiner a (and those presuppositions are satisfied in the context), it would be 
more appropriate to use the whenever the presuppositions are met. 
 It is time to take stock. In the previous paragraphs we have illustrated the 
semantic analysis for both the definite and the indefinite determiners. We have 
also highlighted the principles governing the use of these two determiners. In 
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particular while the definite determiner presupposes the existence and the 
uniqueness of the entity denoted by the noun it combines with, the indefinites 
determiner does not. On the other end, the indefinite determiner is often ruled out 
by the pragmatic principle of Maximize Presuppositions. Let us now turn to 
children’s knowledge of the semantic properties of these determiners.   
 
 
5.3  What children ‘might’ not know 
 
Children’s overuse of the definite determiner the (in situations where the use of 
the indefinite determiner a would be more appropriate) is a well attested 
phenomenon. To illustrate the phenomenon, we review some of the numerous 
studies on children’s acquisition of determiners. One study is by Maratsos (1974). 
Maratsos (1974) used stories to elicit definite and indefinite articles from young 
children. Consider for example, the story dialogue in (16) from the Maratsos 
study (1976;p.440). 
 
 
(16) Once there was someone who wanted to have an animal. He went  out to a 
 pond. He saw two bunches of animals, lots of frogs and lots of turtles; he 
 
 138
 went up with his box, and he put one of them into his box. What did he put 
 in? 
Adult response: a frog (or: a turtle) 
Child’s response: the frog (or: the turtle) 
  
The child’s use of the definite determiner in (16) yields a non-adult utterance. The 
use of the definite determiner the requires that a uniquely salient object is 
detectable in the domain of discourse, by both the hearer and the speaker. This 
follows from the necessity to satisfy the presuppositions of existence and 
uniqueness triggered by the definite article (Heim, 1991). If no ‘unique’ object 
can be identified in the domain of discourse, then the indefinite article a must be 
used instead. Thus, the child’s choice of the definite determiner in the dialogue in 
(16) is inappropriate unless some horse has been previously introduced in the 
discourse, or is highly salient in the context.  
 A typical experiment reporting children’s overuse of the definite 
determiner was conducted by Karmiloff-Smith (1979) using an Elicited 
Production task. In this task, children are encouraged, by features of the 
experimental design, to produce sentences which contain the linguistic 
construction under investigation. In the study by Karmiloff-Smith, French-
speaking children were presented with a girl-doll playroom which contained sets 
of different toys, as in the scenario in (17), and were prompted by the 
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experimenter to ask the girl in the experimental context, manipulated by another 
experimenter, to lend them one of the objects – namely the object the 
experimenter was pointing at.53 Importantly, the object the child was required to 
designate could have been a singleton (baby-bottle) or one of several identical 
objects (multicolored balls). 
 
(17) 1 blue book, 3 multicolored balls and 1 baby bottle 
 
Given the presupposition of uniqueness associated with the definite article, 
children should use the definite determiner the, if the object they are referring to 
is a singleton (i.e., “lend me the baby-bottle”), but the indefinite article a should 
be used if the object is just one of several identical objects (i.e., “lend me a ball”). 
The results show that children correctly used the definite article for the singleton 
set, but they incorrectly used the definite article also when 3 identical objects 
were present. The overuse of the definite article is attested in 3-year olds as well 
as 7-year olds. Only by age 9 did children in the Karmiloff-Smith study behave 
like adults.   
 
 
 
                                                 
53. We refer the reader to the original study for details on the experimental setting.   
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5.3.1  Egocentricity view 
 
A classical and widely accepted explanation for children’s non-adult behavior is 
the Egocentricity view, proposed by Maratsos (1976).54 According to the 
Egocentricity view, children’s misuse of the definite determiner is not linguistic in 
nature. In particular, children fail to recognize that the object they have singled 
out as ‘unique’ in the context might not have been recognized as such by their 
listeners. This is how Maratsos puts it: 
 
“Our analyses have uncovered a developmental stage where 
egocentric definite responding is quite common. The children fail 
to take into account that even if they have established for 
themselves a particular boy or girl, or monkey or pig that does 
something, that referent is not yet unique specified for their 
listener, and must be introduced to the listener with an indefinite 
expression.”         (Maratsos 1976:63) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
54. But see also Karmiloff-Smith (1979). 
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5.3.2 Maximality view 
 
A more recent proposal by Wexler (2003) is linguistic in nature. This account 
attempts to explain children’s non-adult use of the definite determiner by arguing 
that children do not have complete knowledge of the meaning of the definite 
determiner. The Maximality view claims that children have adult knowledge of 
the semantic properties of the indefinite determiner a, have the principle of 
Maximize Presupposition but, have a different lexical entry for the definite 
determiner, called by Wexler (2003) theC. The semantics of children’s definite 
determiner theC is modeled directly on the definition of the Fregean analysis of 
the given in (7), but carries only the presupposition of existence as reported 
below.55  
 
(18) [the φ ] ψ expresses that proposition which is: 
a. true at an index i, if there is at least one φ at i, and it is ψ at i 
b. false at an index i, if there is at least one φ at i, and it is not ψ at i 
c. truth-valueless at an index i, if there isn’t any φ at i. 
 
                                                 
55Experimental evidence seems to suggest that children know the presupposition of existence 
associate with the definite determiner. Children, in fact, correctly use the indefinite determiner 
when no referents have been introduced in the context (cfr. Karmiloff-Smith, 1979). We will add 
to this evidence a the end of the chapter. 
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As shown above, the definite article for children only presupposes that there 
exists at least one entity denoted by the noun the determiner is combined with. 
Crucially, such entity does not have to be unique. What children do not know, 
then, is that the definite determiner the also carries a presupposition of 
uniqueness. Thus a sentence like (19) in a situation in which there are multiple 
sleeping frogs would be interpreted as the paraphrase in (20): 
 
(19) The frog is sleeping. 
 
(20) One of the frogs is sleeping. 
 
In such a context the use of the definite determiner (theC) is preferred over the 
use of the indefinite determiner a because of the pragmatic rule of Maximize 
Presupposition, which is biasing towards the use of the item that carries more 
presuppositions. Since the definite theC carries the presupposition of existence, 
which is satisfied in the context, theC must be preferred. 
To summarize, we have briefly illustrated children’s non-adult use of 
definite and indefinite determiners and we have presented two proposals that 
attempt to account for such non-adult behavior. The last one of these proposals, 
the Maximality view by Wexler (2003), could in principle also explain children’s 
difficulty with the interpretation of sentences like Put the frog on the napkin into 
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the box that we have extensively illustrated in the previous chapters. It is worth 
considering Wexler’s argument. In fact, if, as claimed by Wexler (2003), children 
lack the knowledge that the definite determiner carries the presupposition of 
uniqueness, the sentence in (21) will be interpreted by children as equivalent to 
(22): 
 
(21) Put the frog on the napkin into the box. 
 
(22) Put one of the frogs on the napkin into the box.  
 
In other words, children can pick one frog or the other indifferently. Since they do 
not require the presence of a uniquely salient frog, children will not feel the need 
to attach the PP on the napkin to the definite NP the frog in order to single out a 
single frog. In this respect, Wexler’s account, just like Trueswell et al’s account, 
assumes that children behave at chance in selecting the intended referent for the 
definite NP, and thus it incurs in the same problems in explaining children’s 
actions. In fact, as we observed for Trueswell et al., Wexler’s proposal does not 
explain why children who selected (by chance) the right frog (the one already on a 
napkin) performed the correct action (putting it directly into the box) instead of 
moving it to the other napkin (as they did in the 1-Referent Context). Neither will 
this proposal explain why whenever children selected the wrong frog, the frog off 
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the napkin, they performed the wrong action most of the time. We would like to 
give Wexler’s theory the best chance to succeed, however. A possible way out for 
Wexler (2003) would be to assume, as we proposed, that children could have 
made a pragmatic inference in order to select the intended referent. Even if 
children’s grammar does not require the presence of a uniquely salient frog in the 
context, still a frog must be chosen in order to comply with the request of the 
experimenter. Choosing the frog to move then could be achieved via the 
pragmatic inference we argued for. In fact, the felicity conditions associated with 
commands are still operative and likely to exert an effect. This line of reasoning 
would also predict that children would keep performing the same pragmatic 
inference --putting the frog that is not already on a napkin onto a napkin -- even if 
an indefinite determiner –which does not carry a presupposition of uniqueness—is 
used instead of a definite determiner.56 As a consequence, the account proposed 
by Wexler (2003) would explain why whenever children selected the wrong frog, 
the frog off the napkin they performed the wrong action most of the time: these 
are the children who performed a pragmatic inference in compliance with the 
felicity conditions associated with commands. The question now is whether this 
proposal will also be able to explain children’s correct actions or not. Again, the 
answer is no, if Wexler (2003) assumes, along with Trueswell et al. (1995), that 
children picked the right frog by chance. However, the answer could be yes if 
                                                 
56 An experiment to test such a possibility with both children and adults is in progress. 
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Wexler (2003) assumes, as we do, that the children who have selected the right 
frog did so for the right reason. In Wexler’s terminology, those are children who 
have developed the adult determiner system; they know that the definite 
determiner carries the presupposition of uniqueness.  
 So far, it seems that we are unable to rule out the possibility that children’s 
difficulty in processing a sentence like Put the frog on the napkin into the box are 
due to children’s non adult semantic competence for the definite determiner. The 
proposal advanced by Wexler (2003), however, could not explain why children 
consistently selected the right frog in our own experiment. Interestingly, 
children’s correct performance could not be attributed on of the maneuvers 
introduced, namely phrase-and-then-display. In fact, when the same maneuver 
was introduced in the 1-Referent Context, children went back to commit the same 
mistakes again.  
 From a more general point of view, we think the account proposed by 
Wexler (2003) runs into an even more serious problem which needs to be taken 
into consideration. As we have illustrated, Wexler (2003) claims that children 
have a different semantics for the definite article, that is children lack the 
principle of Uniqueness (or Maximality) which makes ungrammatical (or 
infelicitous) the use of the definite determiner if more than one possible referents 
are present in the context. If this is the case, then the prediction is that children 
should always produce the definite article the in those cases in which the 
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presupposition of uniqueness is crucial57 in determining which determiner, if a 
definite or an indefinite, must be used. However, this prediction is not borne out. 
Although children overuse the definite article in situations where an indefinite 
would be more appropriate, they do not do it all the time. In other words, the same 
child sometimes uses a and sometimes uses the in similar circumstances. 
Moreover, data from Maratsos (1976) show that at a previous stage children 
overuse the indefinite article a rather than the definite article the. Could the 
proposal be modified to account for those mistakes as well? For example, would 
the author assume that at an earlier stage children’s interpretation of the definite 
article also lacks the presupposition of existence, and thus a and the are almost 
equivalent? 
To recap, so far we have reported some experimental results showing that 
children commit mistakes in the use of determiners. We have also presented and 
discussed two different accounts that explain children’s mistakes by appealing to 
what children might not know. The Egocentricity view (Maratsos, 1976) attribute 
children’s mistakes to a gap in children’s pragmatic competence, while the 
Maximality view (Wexler, 2003) attribute children’s mistakes to a lack in 
children’s linguistic competence. It is now time to redeem children. In what 
follows, we would like to investigate what children know about the determiner 
                                                 
57 It is important to restrict the relevant cases to only those in which the presupposition of 
uniqueness is involved because, as Maratsos (1976) and Karmiloff Smith (1979) experiments 
show, children have knowledge of the presupposition of existence. In fact, when the 
presupposition of existence is not satisfied, children correctly used the indefinite article a. 
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system, and in particular about the difference between the definite and the 
indefinite determiner. This constitutes the focus of the remaining of this chapter. 
We will return to these issues in the next chapter when we will present other 
empirical studies in which children’s knowledge of the presupposition of 
uniqueness associated with the definite determiner turns out to be relevant.  
 
 
5.4.  What children do know 
 
In this section we focus on children’s competence of a different linguistic 
property related to the definite/indefinite distinction.  
 
5.4.1 The semantic definiteness effect with ‘have’ constructions  
 
An interesting distinction between definite and indefinite determiners in English 
has been observed since Milsark (1974; 1977). The observation is that existential 
there-sentences may contain an indefinite noun phrase following the copula, but 
definite NPs are ungrammatical in the same linguistic environment, as shown in 
examples (23) and (24). This restriction on the kind of NPs allowed in there-
sentences is known as the Definiteness Effect.  
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(23) There is a man. 
 
(24) * There is the man. 
 
A similar constraint against definites is found in constructions with the verb have, 
on a particular reading. This is known as the ‘semantic definiteness effect.’ To 
illustrate, consider the sentences in (25) and (26).  
 
(25) John has a car. 
 
(26) John has the car. 
 
While (25) can mean that John is the owner of a car, (26) does not mean that John 
is the owner of the specific car under discussion. Rather, the meaning of (26) can 
be paraphrased as John has temporary custody of the car. Following Iatridou 
(1995), we call this interpretation the custodial reading of have. To rephrase the 
point, an indefinite Noun Phrase, as in (25) may yield either a possession or a 
custodial interpretation, whereas a definite NP like (26) can only express a 
custodial meaning. The similarity between the two constraints against definites 
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led linguists to pursue a deconstructionist approach, according to which 
(possessive) have is derived from be.58   
The intuition offered by Iatridou (1995) is that have in possession 
constructions requires an individual variable as its complement. Thus, the 
possession reading of the verb have is possible with an indefinite NP, which 
supplies an individual variable. By contrast, when the NP is definite, it cannot 
provide an individual variable. This does not make the utterance ungrammatical. 
Rather, have is interpreted on its custodial reading, where it selects an eventive 
variable rather than an individual variable. Setting technical details aside, these 
facts point to a distinction in the interpretation of sentences containing the verb 
have which ultimately relate to the distinction between definite and indefinite 
determiners. The question is whether children are sensitive to this distinction. To 
address this question, we turn to the laboratory. 
 
 
5.4.2  Experiment VII 
 
This section presents the findings of an experiment designed to investigate 
whether children distinguish between a possession and a custodial reading of the 
verb have in sentences containing the definite determiner the and the indefinite 
                                                 
58. Interestingly, in both type of constructions the constraint is against all strong determiners (in 
the sense of Milsark, 1974).  
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determiner a. The experimental technique is the Truth Value Judgment task 
(Crain and McKee, 1985; Crain and Thornton, 1998). In a Truth Value Judgment 
task, one experimenter acts out a short story in front of the child, using props and 
toys. A second experimenter manipulates a puppet, who watches the story with 
the child subject. At the end of the story, the puppet utters the target sentence. At 
this point, the child is asked to evaluate the target sentence as a description of the 
story she has just seen. The acceptance of the target sentence is interpreted as 
indicating that the child can access an interpretation that makes the target sentence 
true in the context under consideration. By contrast, the rejection of the target 
sentence is taken as evidence that the child’s grammar does not license any 
interpretation that makes the sentence true in the context. In the present 
experiment, the story establishes a context in which a particular character is the 
owner of a given object but does not have the custody of that object at the time 
the target sentence is produced (i.e., at the completion of the story). Let us 
illustrate a typical trial: 
 
(27) This is a story about Grumpy. Grumpy owns two dogs and he would like 
to have them brushed. So Grumpy asks Tommy the Ranger, who knows a 
lot about animals, to brush his dogs. Unfortunately, Tommy has time to 
brush only one of Grumpy’s dogs. Grumpy thinks for a little while then he 
decides which dog needs to be brushed and then goes away with the other 
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dog. Before leaving, however, Grumpy tells Tommy that he will be back 
in an hour to pick up his dog. Left alone, Tommy brushes Grumpy’s dog 
and then waits for Grumpy to come back. While he is waiting, Winnie the 
Pooh comes by. He sees Tommy with the dog and says: “Hey Tommy, 
that’s a really nice dog you have. Do you mind if I take him for a walk?” 
and Tommy replies: “Actually this is Grumpy’s dog and he wanted me to 
take good care of him. But you can take him for a very short walk. But 
you have to bring the dog back before Grumpy comes.” At this point, 
Winnie leaves with Grumpy’s dog — the one that Tommy brushed.   
 
Thirty children participated in the experiment. The children were divided into two 
groups. One group of fifteen children (age: 3;09 to 5;05 -mean age 4;09) was 
asked to evaluate a sentence that contains an indefinite determiner as in (28).  
 
(28) Grumpy has a dog that Tommy brushed. 
 
Notice that the sentence in (28) is ambiguous. The string “has + a” has both a 
possession and a custodial reading. Under the possession reading, the sentence 
accurately describes the final outcome of the story. By contrast, under the 
custodial reading, the sentence in (28) is false; Grumpy is the owner of the dog 
that Tommy brushed, but he doesn’t have custody of that dog at the time the 
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target sentence is uttered. Under the assumption that, all things being equal, a 
cooperative subject will attempt to access an interpretation that makes the 
sentence true, in compliance with the Maxim of Charity (Davidson, 1984; Grice, 
1975), we expect children to accept the sentence in (28). 
The second group of fifteen children (age 3;10 to 5;08 - mean age 4;10) 
was asked to evaluate sentence (29). This sentence differs from (28) only in that 
the indefinite determiner a has been replaced with the definite determiner the.  
 
(29) Grumpy has the dog that Tommy brushed. 
 
Given the presence of the definite article, however, this sentence is not an 
accurate description of the final outcome of the story. As noted earlier, the string 
‘have + the’ does not license a possession interpretation, but this is the only 
interpretation that would make the sentence true. Thus, if children know that a 
sentence like (29) only licenses a custodial interpretation, they should reject the 
sentence based on the fact that Grumpy does not have custody of the dog that 
Tommy brushed at the time the sentence is uttered. By contrast, if children treat 
the definite determiner on a par with the indefinite determiner in the context under 
consideration (for the verb have), ignoring the difference in interpretation yielded 
by the two determiners, they should accept (29).  
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Here are the findings. Children accepted sentences like (28) in 53 out of 
60 trials (88%), whereas they accepted sentences like (29) only in 6 out of 60 
trials (10%). These findings suggest that children know the properties of the string 
‘have + a/the’ and are sensitive to the difference between the two determiners.   
 Before drawing any conclusions, however, one point of clarification is 
needed. A possible explanation of children’s results would be that children always 
assign a custodial interpretation to the definite determiner the, regardless of the 
linguistic construction in which these determiners occur.  
To address this concern, we tested another group of children in a control 
condition. The third group of fifteen children (from 3;06 to 5;08 - mean age 4;08) 
was asked to evaluate sentences like (30), in which the string ‘have + the’ has 
been replaced with ‘own + the’. The task and the story were the same as above in 
all important respects. 
 
(30) Grumpy owns the dog that Tommy brushed. 
 
The sentence in (30) truthfully describes the outcome of the story. Children were 
therefore expected to accept (30) relative to the context. It is important to notice 
that the sentence (30) contains the definite determiner the, as does sentence (29). 
So, if children accessed the possession reading of (30), thereby accepting the 
sentence, it would mean that children can only assign a custodial reading to the 
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definite determiner the. Rather, they are sensitive the properties of the string ‘have 
+ the.’ 
The results show that this is indeed the case. Children accepted the 
sentence in (30) 58 times out of 60 trials (96%), on the grounds that Grumpy had 
permanent possession of the dog that Tommy brushed.  
We conclude that children know a theoretically motivated distinction 
between the definite and indefinite articles. Moreover, our findings show that 4-
year-olds know the restriction against definites as objects of have on its 
possession reading. 
 
 
5.5  Interim conclusions 
 
We think that the importance of the experiment we presented is twofold. First, the 
findings show children’s indirect knowledge of the definiteness effect. Second, 
the findings provide evidence in favor of children’s knowledge of 
presuppositional force. Let see each of them in turn. 
 As we illustrated before, what is being referred to as the Definiteness 
Effect since Milsark (1974;1977) is the restriction exhibited by existential 
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constructions, i.e., there-sentences, against strong determiners59 as for example, 
the, every, most.  From the point of view of language acquisition, it would be 
interesting to see whether children’s grammar reflects this linguistic property of 
existential sentences. One source of evidence could come from the analysis of 
children’s spontaneous data. This kind of evidence presents some shortcomings 
though. First, one could have to draw a conclusion on a negative result, that is 
from the absence in children’s spontaneous speech of existential sentences 
containing strong determiners (see Becker, 2000). Second, as pointed out by 
Becker (2000), in coding children’s spontaneous existential utterances it is 
difficult to tell whether utterances containing the expletive there are actually 
existential expressions or deictic (locative) expressions, since both existential and 
deictic (locative) expressions have the same form. Interestingly, one of the 
properties that differentiate between the two uses of there-sentences is that deictic 
expressions may have a definite post-copular determiner (e.g. There/here is 
John/the car), while existentials may not. 
As a consequence, even the few cases in which a definite determiner 
occurs in a there-sentences, will not constitute clear evidence against children’s 
knowledge of the Definiteness Effect. This leads us to the role played by the 
semantic definiteness effect observed in have-constructions. In fact, these 
                                                 
59 The partition of determiners into two classes, weak and strong, is again due to Milsark (1974; 
1977). The classification is descriptive and it is based on the possibility for a determiner to occur 
in existential there-sentences: weak determiners can, while strong determiners cannot. 
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constructions are grammatical regardless of which determiner follow the verb 
have. The type of determiner used in the have-sentence only dictates the possible 
readings of that sentence: i.e., custodial or both custodial and possession. Thus, by 
assuming that the Definiteness Effect exhibited by there-sentences and the 
semantic Definiteness Effect displayed by have-constructions are two different 
manifestations of the same linguistic phenomena we can conclude children’s 
knowledge of that linguistic property.  
 This said, we can now turn to the second reason why we think our study is 
relevant. As we just briefly mentioned (cfr. Ft.59) the classification of determiners 
in strong and weak was introduced by Milsark (1974;1977). The defining 
characteristic is that only the latter can occur in existential there-sentences. About 
this distinction, Heim (1982) observed that the defining characteristic of strong 
determiners is the presupposition of existence that they carry. It is in fact this 
presupposition of existence that makes strong determiners incompatible with the 
existential there constructions (see also, among the others, Barwise and Cooper 
1981, Reuland 1983; 1985, and Zucchi, 1995): existentials constructions assert 
what strong determiners presuppose, and the pragmatic clash created when they 
are combined results in the ungrammaticality of such sentences.60 As a 
                                                 
60 There are other theories that try to account for the definiteness effect, some of those from a pure 
syntactic point of view. However, the semantic analyses generally appeal to the presupposition of 
existence of the strong quantifiers and explain both data from other languages which do not 
exhibit the syntactic definiteness effect, (i.e., Italian) and data from locative there-sentences (in 
strong quantifiers can occur). 
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consequence, children’s knowledge of the (semantic) definiteness effect, is also 
suggestive of their knowledge of the presuppositional force of a strong determiner 
as the.61 This is an important result in light of recent theories according to which 
children are unable to represent the presuppositional force of strong quantifiers, 
thus treating them as weak quantifiers. (Geurts, 2002 – Drozd and van Loesborek, 
1998). Clearly the fact that children fail to map the presuppositional force of all 
strong determiners, thus interpreting them as they were weak, cannot be the case 
otherwise children would have ignored the difference in interpretation in have-
constructions when a weak or a strong determiner occurs. The claim that children 
might have problems in recognizing the presuppositional force of strong 
determiners has been proposed in order to explain children’s non-adult 
interpretation of the universal quantifier ever.62 A way to test this hypothesis 
would be to conduct a different version of the experiment presented above, one in 
which the definite determiner the is replaced with the universal quantifier every. 
We report about this study in the next section. 
 
                                                 
61 Again, here we are assuming that, given the parallelism between there-sentences and have-
constructions as hypothesized by Iatridou (1995), the restriction against strong determiners is 
motivated by the same principles. 
62 But see Crain et al. 1996, Meroni et al. 2000V and Meroni 2002 for an alternative explanation 
of children’s mistakes. In particular, these authors contend that children have a full adultlike 
understanding of sentences containing every and attribute their mistake to an experimental 
artifacts. Evidence in favor of this hypothesis comes form a series of experiments which 
demonstrate: 1) children adultlike interpretations of sentences containing every in felicitous 
situations and 2) childlike behavior from adults in infelicitous situations, the same situations 
responsible for children errors. 
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5.5.1 Experiment VIII 
 
This section presents the findings of an experiment designed to investigate 
whether children distinguish between a possession and a custodial reading of the 
verb have in sentences containing the universal quantifier every. Children were 
tested using the Truth Value Judgment task and were asked to evaluate sentences 
like (31);  
 
(31) Tigger has every rooster that the farmer fed. 
 
The story, against which to evaluate (31) set up a context in which Tigger is the 
owner of the roosters that have been fed by the farmer but he does not have 
custody of them when the target sentence is uttered. In fact, a third character, 
Gonzo, has custody of them. So, in our story the possession reading makes the 
sentence true, because Tigger is indeed the owner of the roosters; on the contrary, 
the custodial reading makes the sentence false: Gonzo, and not Tigger, has 
custody of every rooster fed by the farmer. Let us recall, that every should behave 
as the in have-constructions. Both determiners belong to the class of strong 
determiners, which are also referred to as presuppositional determiners, and are 
subject to the definiteness effect. It follows that a string like have + every can only 
receive a custodial interpretation. The prediction will then be that if children 
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interpret a strong quantifier like every as weak they should access the possession 
reading thus accepting the sentence.63 By contrast, if children know and apply the 
distinction between strong and week determiners, they should access only the 
custodial reading, thus rejecting the target sentence.64 Ten children (age from 3;0 
to 5;1, mean age: 4;4;) have been tested in this experiment. Every child was 
presented with four target trials and four filler trials to balance yes and no 
responses. The preliminary results show that children consistently reject the target 
sentence (33 times out of 39 trials, 85%) on the grounds that that Tigger doesn’t 
have custody of every rooster.65 We take this result as evidence that children 
recognize the presuppositional force of the universal quantifier every.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In the present chapter, we examined children’s use and interpretation of definite and indefinite 
determiners. First, we reviewed children’s non-adult use of the definite article the in contexts in 
which adults would use the indefinite a, and we illustrated two accounts of children’s 
overgeneration of the definite determiner the. After reviewing what children do not know about 
the determiner system, we focused on what children do know. We took have-constructions as a 
case study. These constructions in fact receive a different interpretation—custodial or both 
                                                 
63 In analogy with children’s interpretation of the string ‘have+a’, reported in Experiment VII. 
64 In analogy with children’s interpretation of the string ‘have+the’ reported in Experiment VII. 
65 The total number of trials do not amount to 40 because one child did not answer to one trial. 
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possession and custodial-- depending on whether the NP in post-verbal position is definite or 
indefinite. This phenomenon has been know as the semantic counterpart of the Definiteness Effect 
of existential there-sentences since the class of determiners involved—the class of strong 
determiner—is the same for both linguistic constructions. We reported the results of a series of 
experiments designed to investigate children’s competence of the (semantic) Definiteness Effect. 
In so doing, we compared the string have+a, for which both the custodial and the possession 
readings are possible, with the string have+the, in which only the custodial reading is allowed. 
The findings show that children are sensitive to the distinction between the definite and the 
indefinite determiner and are also aware of the (semantic) Definiteness Effect. Drawing upon the 
similarities between there-sentences and have-constructions we extended our study to another 
determiner belonging to the class of the strong determiners. As we illustrated, in fact, strong 
determiners as opposed to weak determiners, are subject to the Definiteness Effect. The universal 
quantifier every fits our purposes and also allows us to evaluate a recent proposal by Geurts (2002) 
which claims that children represent every as a weak quantifier. The result of our experiment 
shows that this cannot be the case. Children treat every in analogy with the strong determiner the, 
and in contrast with a weak quantifier like a. 
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